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1	BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPOR	CATION COMMISSION			
2	JEFF HATCH-MILLER AZ CORP	COMMISSION			
3	Chairman WILLIAM MUNDELL	T CONTROL"			
5	Commissioner MARC SPITZER Commissioner				
6	MIKE GLEASON Commissioner				
7	KRISTIN MAYES Commissioner				
8					
9	IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF QWEST	DOCKET NO. T-02811B-04-0313			
10	COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION D/B/A QWEST LONG DISTANCE FOR	QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION'S POST-HEARING			
11	EXTENSION OF ITS EXISTING CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE	BRIEF			
12	AND NECESSITY TO INCLUDE AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE RESOLD				
13	AND FACILITIES-BASED LOCAL EXCHANGE AND RESOLD LONG DISTANCE SERVICES IN ADDITION	2005 AZ C DOC			
14	DISTANCE SERVICES IN ADDITION TO ITS CURRENT AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE FACILITIES-BASED LONG	SEP SEP			
15	DISTANCE SERVICES, AND PETITION FOR COMPETITIVE	i a m			
16	CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSED SERVICES WITHIN THE STATE OF	OHAISS III D			
17	ARIZONA	Signal 52			
18					
19	Qwest Communications Corporation	n ("QCC" or "Applicant") hereby files its			
20	Post-Hearing Brief. QCC requests that the Arizona Corporation Commission				
21	("Commission") issue its order approving QCC's Application and Petition for Certificate				
22	of Convenience and Necessity.				
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I. INTRODUCTION

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The Enterprise Market¹ for telecommunications services is competitive.² Enterprise Market customers commonly consider the availability of "one-stop shopping" (where they can secure all of their telecommunications services, including local and long distance, from a single vendor) as an important factor in making buying decisions. A number of competitors, large and small, have entered the Enterprise Market, and every one of the new competitors provides both local and long distance services to customers in that Market. However, unless the Commission approves this Application, under the structure created by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act"), which opened telecommunications to competition, no single company from the Owest family of companies may provide both local exchange services and interLATA telecommunications services to Enterprise customers in Arizona. This proceeding arises because OCC, a Owest entity that is authorized to provide interexchange services, applied for operating authority to provide local exchange services to Enterprise customers in the parts of Arizona where Owest Corporation ("QC") is the incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"), and for authority to serve all kinds of customers in the rest of the state. Without the requested Certificate of Convenience and Necessity ("CC&N"), QCC will not be able to provide the "one-stop shopping" capability its Enterprise customers demand and that existing competitors currently offer. This Commission's grant of the authority requested will position QCC to bring further competition to the Enterprise Market.

QCC meets all the criteria established by statute and rules governing grants of CC&N. The Arizona Corporation Commission Staff ("Staff"), the only party in this

The parties are in agreement that the Enterprise Market is defined as large business and government customers subscribing to 4 or more lines. See Second Staff Report, Hearing Exhibit S-2 at 2; Supplemental Rebuttal Testimony of M. LaFave on behalf of Owest Communications Corporation, Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 3 n. 1.

See infra at 15-16, 43-44.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 ("Act"). See 47 U.S.C. §§ 15 et seg.

proceeding besides the Applicant, acknowledges that QCC is a fit and proper applicant, and that its Application is complete. Notwithstanding that acknowledgement, Staff urges the Commission to deny entirely the right to serve within the ILEC territory, or alternatively, to grant QCC's requested authorization, but with serious restrictions and conditions. Staff proposes to deprive QCC of its right to file in the future for more extensive authorization than it has requested here, and to saddle QCC and its affiliated ILEC with burdensome and costly record generation, recordkeeping and reporting obligations placed uniquely on QCC and its affiliated ILEC.

The primary issues presented are whether an applicant meeting all of the qualification criteria and other requirements provided by the Commission's rules may (1) lawfully be denied the CC&N it has requested, or (2) have its CC&N laden with burdensome and costly obligations that do not appear in any rule or Commission order, or in any other CC&Ns issued by the Commission, and be enjoined from filing future petitions to expand its authority. QCC believes that where an applicant that meets all the written qualifications rules, and is not disqualified by reason of any established disqualification criteria, the Commission must issue its order granting the CC&N.

Staff's proposed restrictions and conditions should be denied. The application of unwritten rules and criteria that are conceived and applied solely to this Applicant would be arbitrary and capricious, discriminatory, not competitively neutral, and violate principles of equal protection. Such action would be unlawful under the United States and Arizona Constitutions, as well as Arizona statutes, and the Act.

A denial of the CC&N requested by the Applicant, and an order enjoining Applicant from filing future petitions for greater authority than it has presently requested, each constitutes a prohibition of QCC's ability to provide intrastate telecommunications service. Such prohibition is unlawful under Section 253(a) of the Act, and is not saved by the state regulatory authority savings clause in Section 253(b) of the Act, because the

restrictions demanded by Staff are not imposed on CLECs on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis.

In all events, the restrictions and conditions recommended by Staff lack rational relationship to the concerns Staff describes in its filings and testimony, are unreasonable or unduly burdensome, or are matters properly addressed in other dockets or generic proceedings. QCC points out that the Iowa Commission adopted alternative reporting mechanisms that would serve the Staff's stated purposes, and do so more economically.

The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") hearing this matter requested that the parties address certain questions concerning the effect on the affiliate ILEC that may follow from QCC's market entrance. The record in this proceeding shows that these concerns are not reasons to deny or condition QCC's certificate, given the competitiveness of the Enterprise Market. Regardless, when the ILEC loses retail customers but retains a wholesale relationship to the new provider for the lost retail customer, under the Commission's previous holdings and analysis, the ILEC is kept whole financially.

Another matter the ALJ raised concerns the limited waiver of the Commission's Affiliated Interest Rule 803, regarding organization and reorganizations of public utility holding companies, previously granted to the Qwest family of companies. The question posed by the ALJ is whether the limited waiver should be changed in light of this Application. Since this Application does not involve any such reorganization, the waiver is not implicated either, and should be left intact. Staff agrees no change in the waiver is necessary, but seeks to couple the waiver to new reporting obligations it would have the Commission impose.

Staff attempts to use the ALJ's questions as a reason to support the unlawful restrictions and conditions it seeks to place on QCC. Staff's attempt to justify its restrictions and conditions are unreasonable for these purposes as well.

Last, and importantly, the Commission should grant QCC's Application because the important goals of the Act relating to the promotion of competition, the reduction of regulation, the securing of lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers, and the encouragement of the deployment of new telecommunications technologies and innovation, are advanced by QCC's entrance into the markets it has requested. Customers in the Enterprise Market make buying decisions based on the providers' ability to solve all of the customer's telecommunications needs. Currently, no entity within the Qwest family of companies can provide the true "one-stop shopping" those customers desire, and Enterprise customers are moving to Qwest's competitors in increasing numbers. The public interest will be served by the grant of this Application because of the addition of QCC as a competitor and as an available choice for Enterprise Market customers.

II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THIS PROCEEDING

A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 amended the Communications Act of 1934. The legislation was enacted in an effort "to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunication consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." With the passing of the Act, Congress "ended the longstanding regime of state-sanctioned monopolies [of local telephone service]" by "fundamentally restructur[ing] local telephone markets."

The Act requires providers of telecommunications services to interconnect directly

Id.

AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999). See also, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (Act created new telecommunications regime designed to foster competition in local telephone markets).

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or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other providers. Under the Act, ILECs have additional obligations to provide to requesting carriers (i) interconnection to its local exchange network that is equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself or any affiliate, on nondiscriminatory rates, terms and conditions, (ii) nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis, (iii) telecommunications service for resale at wholesale rates without unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations upon the resale of such service, and (iv) physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements on rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.

Other provisions of the Act apply only to Bell Operating Companies ("BOC[s]"),8 one of which is QC, formerly known as U S WEST Communications Corporation, Inc. Among those provisions are 47 U.S.C. § 271 and § 272, which read together provide that originating interLATA services may only be provided by an affiliate separate from the BOC ILEC. The separate affiliate must operate independently from the BOC. 10 Sweeping nondiscrimination safeguards apply to the dealings between a Section 272 affiliate and the BOC, to assure that the BOC does not discriminate between that affiliate and any other entity in the provision or procurement of goods, services, facilities, and information, or in the establishment of standards.¹¹

As part of the Act's scheme to end the regime of state-sanctioned monopolies in local telephone service, the Act provides that "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the

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See 47 U.S.C. § 272 (a). See 47 U.S.C. § 272(b). See 47 U.S.C. § 272(c) & (e). 11

47 U.S.C. §§ 153(44), 251(a). 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c). See 47 U.S.C. § 153(4).

ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."12

В. The Applicant OCC

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1. OCC Is an Entity Separate and Distinct From the ILEC QC.

The Applicant in this proceeding is Owest Communications Corporation, which throughout has been referred to as "OCC." The ultimate parent corporation of OCC is Owest Communications International Inc., which owns Owest Services Corporation. Owest Services Corporation, in turn, owns QCC and QC.¹³ QC is the ILEC and BOC that provides local exchange services in defined areas in Arizona. OC is prohibited by Section 271 of the Act from providing originating interLATA telecommunications services; in contrast, OCC may provide interLATA and intraLATA long distance and private line services, and if properly certificated, may also provide local exchange services. 14

2. QCC is a Business Corporation Organized Independently From QC, and Operates as a Section 272 Separate Affiliate.

QCC is a for-profit business corporation formed under the laws of the State of Delaware. 15 QCC currently holds a CC&N from the Commission to provide facilitiesbased interexchange services. 16 QCC operates in accordance with the Section 272 separation requirements: It has separate operations, separate books and accounts, separate officers, directors and employees, and operates on an arm's length basis from OC. OCC is unable to financially obligate OC or encumber OC's assets. 17 Transactions between

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¹² 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (emphasis added).

¹³ See Supplemental Rebuttal Testimony of Mary Ferguson LaFave, Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 1-2.

See Id.. See also, discussion infra at Section III.e.1. 15

See Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 2. QC, on the other hand, is a Colorado corporation. On December 4, 2003, the Commission approved QCC's request for a CC&N to provide competitive Facilities-Based Long Distance Telephone Services in Decision No. 66612. With the current Application, QCC is requesting to have its CC&N modified to include Resold Long Distance Service, Resold Local Exchange Service Facilities-Based Local Exchange Service, in addition to the competitive Facilities-Based Long Distance authority previously granted.

See Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 2 (lines 12-22). See also, 47 U.S.C. § 272 (b).

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OCC and OC are posted for public inspection¹⁸ so other carriers know about the transactions, and may avail themselves of the same services from QC on nondiscriminatory rates, terms, and conditions.

The Business Purpose of QCC's Application C.

A substantial part of the Enterprise Market wants to deal with a single entity rather than multiple entities for their telecommunications needs, whether those are local exchange service, Asynchronous Transfer Mode and frame data products, long distance or dedicated Internet access. They seek service from a single entity, with a single contact, a single bill, and one place to go to for accountability for service. This is commonly referred to as "one-stop shopping." No single Owest entity can provide "one-stop shopping" currently. The business purpose behind the Application is to enable the 272 affiliate - the only Qwest company that may legally be so enabled - to provide both local exchange services and interLATA services, and to offer Enterprise Market customers one stop shopping.²⁰

D. The Application

Nearly one and one half years ago, on April 23, 2004, QCC filed an Application and Petition²¹ with the Commission requesting that its existing CC&N be extended to include the authority to provide competitive resold long distance service, competitive resold local exchange service and competitive facilities-based local exchange service in addition to the competitive facilities-based long distance authority previously granted. In the initial filing, the local exchange services for which the CC&N was requested were not limited in scope geographically or by type or category of customer.

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁹ See Id. at 3-4. 20

Qwest Communications Corporation Application and Petition, Hearing Exhibit A-1.

On December 17, 2004, QCC filed a Supplement to Application and Petition.²² That filing supplemented Section A-9 of the Application and Petition by adding a new proposed Local Exchange Services QCC Arizona Tariff No. 3, which included certain business services.²³

On February 23, 2005, Staff filed its First Staff Report on the revised application.²⁴ Staff recommended approval of the CC&N with the restriction that the approval should initially be limited to areas outside of the QC ILEC service area.

On May 13, 2005, Staff filed its Second Staff Report.²⁵ In the Second Staff Report, Staff presented an alternative recommendation:

Staff is filing this supplement to its February 23, 2005, Staff Report in order to present an alternative recommendation which would allow QCC to provide resold and facilities-based local service to Large Business customers within QC's service territory. Staff believes that this approach would respond to the Company's concern about the ability to market services to Large Business customers through one entity yet would also address Staff's primary concerns which relate to the small business and residential markets.²⁶

On May 16, 2005, QCC filed its Second Supplement to its Application and Petition²⁷ to narrow the scope of the requested certificate for resold and facilities-based local exchange services. The Second Supplement Application contains certain *self-imposed* geographic and customer category restrictions. Inside the QC local

Qwest Communications Corporation Supplement to Application and Petition, Hearing Exhibit A-2.

The services listed were: Basic Local Voice Service; Direct-Inward Dialing Services; Custom Calling Services, Hunting Services; Directory Listing Services, Local Operator Services; Local Directory Assistance Service; Screening and Restriction Services; Caller Identification Blocking Options; IntraLATA, Intraexchange Private Line Services; Customer Premises Wire and Maintenance Plans; and ISDN PRI services. The tariff pages relating to the aforesaid services were also filed, as amended by an errata filing made on January 12, 2005. See Notice of Errata, Hearing Exhibit A-3.

First Staff Report, Hearing Exhibit S-1.
Second Staff Report, Hearing Exhibit S-2.

Hearing Exhibit S-1 at 1.

Owest Communications Corporation Second Supplement to Application and Petition, Hearing Exhibit A-4.

exchange service area, QCC seeks the right to provide competitive resold and facilities-based local exchange services only to business and government customers²⁸ with 4 or more switched access lines or their equivalent.²⁹ The other portions of its Application, as related to the scope and type of authority, were not changed.

Thus, the QCC Application and Petition currently before the Commission *does not*

Thus, the QCC Application and Petition currently before the Commission does no seek the authority to provide local exchange services to residential and small business customers inside the QC service area. The QCC Application currently before the Commission limits QCC's authority to provide local exchange services inside the QC service area to Enterprise customers, a market which Staff calls "highly competitive" in Arizona.

E. Staff's Proposed Restrictions and Conditions

In the First Staff Report, Staff raised 5 "concerns" related to the Application as it

As clarified by the testimony, "enterprise customer segment" includes governments and government agencies. See Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 4 (II. 7-10).

Second Supplement to Application and Petition, Exhibit 1, Section A-10. The

complete statement of the markets QCC requests authority to serve is stated as follows:

QCC requests that its existing CC&N for competitive Facilities Bases Long
Distance Service be modified to include the following additional services for the

geographic areas indicated:

Competitive Resold Long Distance Service on a statewide basis.

2. Competitive Resold and Facilities-Based Local Exchange Service on a statewide basis for large business customers and/or accounts with 4 or more switched access lines or their equivalent. For purposes of determining an eligible large business account, all individual locations of a multi-location customer shall be added together to determine whether the 4 switched access lines or their equivalent threshold has been met for a given customer/account.

3. Competitive Resold and Facilities-Based Local Exchange Service for residence customers and small business customers and/or accounts with three or less switched access lines or their equivalent who are located

outside QC's service territory.

Hearing Exhibit S-1 at 8:

These unresolved concerns encompass, inter alia,

1. The ability of QCC to leverage QC's ILEC position and engage in anticompetitive conduct including but not limited to cross-subsidization and, price-squeezing;

2. The potential for significant confusion on the part of customers given the similarity in names;

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then stood to provide competitive local exchange services within the QC service area, including residential, small business and Enterprise customers. Staff proposed to resolve its concerns by recommending that QCC's Application should be approved only with respect to areas outside of QC's service territory.³¹ QCC responded to the First Staff Report by filing its Response to Staff Report, on March 16, 2005.³² A copy of QCC's Response to Staff Report is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

However, upon further reflection, as noted above, Staff reconsidered the matter and issued its Second Staff Report, "in order to present an *alternative recommendation* which would allow QCC to provide resold and facilities-based local service to Large Business customers within QC's service territory." Staff concluded that "this approach would respond to the Company's concern about the ability to market services to Large Business customers through one entity yet would also address Staff's primary concerns which relate to the small business and residential markets."³³

Having resolved its old concerns in the Second Staff Report, Staff created some new ones. The QCC Application currently before the Commission voluntarily limits QCC's authority to provide local exchange services inside the QC service area to Enterprise customers. Staff acknowledges in the Second Staff Report that the Enterprise Market is highly competitive, and that competition would be served by granting QCC's

4. The potential for discrimination by QC.

Id. at 8, 21. Staff recommendation number 19 states: "That QCC should initially be approved to provide service only in areas outside of QC service territory."

While Staff states that the restrictions and conditions it proposes in its Second Staff Report alleviate the concerns Staff surfaced regarding potential for anti-competitive conduct and discrimination by Qwest (see Hearing Exhibit S-2 at 1-2), QCC reaffirms the arguments made in its Reply with respect to those issues.

See Hearing Exhibit S-2 at 1 (emphasis added).

^{3.} Use of QCC (the CLEC) to evade QC's (the ILEC) obligations within QC's service territory.

^{5.} Whether it is in the public interest for an RBOC to have an affiliated CLEC operating within its territory, when the local market is not sufficiently competitive.

Application.³⁴ Yet Staff illogically continues to state that its First Staff Report, which would completely prohibit QCC from providing local exchange services inside the QC service area, is an alternative proposal to the Second Staff Report.³⁵

Further, the QCC Application and Petition currently before the Commission does not seek authority to provide local exchange services to residential and small business customers inside the QC service area. Yet, Staff stands by its request that the Commission enjoin QCC from filing for authority to provide such service for 24 months.³⁶ There is no basis in law for that proposition, or for the Commission to close its doors to any entity that seeks to provide intrastate telecommunications services.

Notwithstanding Staff's conclusion that the Enterprise Market is competitive³⁷ and QC has a "diminished presence" in that Market,³⁸ and regardless that the Staff's previously stated concerns are alleviated by limiting QCC to serving Enterprise customers only for local exchange services within the QC serving area, Staff devised recommendations for a number of new record generation and reporting requirements³⁹ to be performed and made by QCC and QC. QCC objects to these requirements on the basis that they are unreasonable for the reasons discussed at length below.

Through the First Staff Report and the "alternative" Second Staff Report, Staff made a number of recommendations regarding restrictions and conditions Staff believes should be adopted by the Commission. QCC does not object to those conditions that are commonly placed on any carrier seeking competitive services certification. To be clear on the matters QCC contests, Qwest lists below each restriction and condition to which it

See Hearing Exhibit S-2 at 2.

Id. at 1, 6; Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings ("TR"), Vol. I. at 153 (lines 6-12). Exhibit S-2 at 7;TR, Vol. I at 203 (lines 23-25), 204 (lines 1-25), & 205 (lines 1-

 $[\]frac{20}{37}$. *Id.* at 2. *Id.* at 3.

See Exhibit S-2 at 8.

objects:

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First Staff Report (Hearing Exhibit S-1)

Staff's recommendation that QCC should initially be approved to provide [facilities-based or resale local exchange] service in exchanges where ILECs other than OC are providing telephone services. Section 3.1 at 11; Section 6.1 at 21, ¶ 19.

Second Staff Report (Hearing Exhibit S-2) (Where scope of OCC's Authority to provide local exchange services in QC's service area is limited to Enterprise customers)

- Section III.3.at 7: In its entirety, Staff's recommendation that QCC should not file an application to amend its certification to provide local exchange services to residence an/or small business customers in the OC service area in Arizona for a period of 24 months from the date of the Commission's Order approving its request for an expanded CC&N.
- Section III.4. at 7: Only to the extent Staff's recommendation stated therein adopts or refers to the "24 month period" discussed in Section III.3.
- Section III.8.b.1-5 at 8 in its entirety.⁴⁰

The full text of the conditions stated in Section III.8.b.1-5, to which QCC objects, are as follows:

^{1.} The total number of business accounts that have moved from QC to QCC by QC wire center are to be provided in excel file format using electronic media.

2. The total number of business lines that have moved from QC to QCC by QC

wire center are to be provided in excel file format using electronic media.

^{3.} The total annualized revenues associated with total business accounts provided in excel file format using electronic media.

^{4.} State-wide summarized Listings Data should be provided. The information should contain all main listings and additional line listings by QC, QCC, CLECs, ILECs, Wireless Providers or Other for each NPA-NXX. This information should be separated by residence and business and include a count of all listings in QC's comprehensive databases(s), not just those published in the white pages directories or available via directory assistance. All information should be rolled up to the NPA-NXX level; no end-user specific information should be provided. The information shall be provided in excel file format using electronic media.

Section III.2, and III.5-7 for the reason that the wording of those recommendations would, if adopted, inappropriately place orders directly on QC, which is not a party to this proceeding, thereby inappropriately encumbering QCC's CC&N.

III. ARGUMENT

A. QCC's Application Should Be Granted Because QCC Has Met All the Requirements, and Is a Fit and Proper Applicant.

The Commission's rules regarding the grant of CC&Ns are straightforward. QCC has met all the requirements for the CC&N it has requested, and the Application should be approved.

A.A.C. R14-2-1106 clearly enumerates 5 reasons why the Commission may deny certification to any telecommunications company:

The Commission, after notice and hearing, may deny certification to any telecommunications company which:

- 1. Does not provide the information required by this Article;
- 2. Is not offering competitive services, as defined in this Article;
- 3. Does not possess adequate financial resources to provide the proposed services;
- 4. Does not possess adequate technical competency to provide the propose services; or
- 5. Fails to provide a performance bond, if required.

- a. All Switch CLLIs
- b. All Switch Locations (addresses)
- c. All Switch Owner Names
- d. All Switch Owner ID

f. All owner names corresponding to each NPA NXXs, or thousands block where NPA NXXs are shared.

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^{5.} State-wide summarized LERG Information should be provided. The report should contain the following column headings and be provided in excel file format using electronic media:

e. All NPA NXXs, or thousands blocks where NPA NXXs are shared, assigned to each switch

The Commission's rules regarding CC&Ns for competitive telecommunications services also require that there be a finding that services also are competitive⁴¹ and that the proposed tariff rates for services are just and reasonable.⁴² QCC passes all of these requirements.

1. The Application is Administratively Complete and Notice Was Published Properly.

On February 2, the Staff issued "Staff's Letter of Administrative Completeness," ⁴³ certifying that QCC's application was administratively complete as an application for a CC&N request filed under A.A.C. 14-2-1103 *et seq*. QCC properly published its Notice of Application and Hearing in this matter, pursuant to the Procedural Order issued February 1, 2005, as evidenced by the affidavit of publication filed in this Docket on February 24, 2005. ⁴⁴

2. <u>Staff Found That the Services QCC Proposes to Offer Are Competitive.</u>

In the First Staff Report, Staff states its findings regarding the Applicant's request that its services be classified as competitive using the criteria established in A.A.C. R14-2-1108.⁴⁵ With respect to interexchange services, Staff concludes that the market is fully competitive.⁴⁶ With respect to local service, outside the QC local exchange areas, where QCC proposes to offer competitive local exchange services, QCC will be contending against the established ILECs as well as CLECs holding statewide certifications. With respect to local exchange services within the QC service area, where QCC proposes to offer local exchange services only to Enterprise customers, in the Second Staff Report, Staff concluded that "the Enterprise Market is highly competitive."

⁴¹ A.A.C. R14-2-1105(B) and R14-2-1108.

⁴² A.A.C. R14-2-1105(C) and R14-2-1104(D).

Hearing Exhibit A-5.

Notice of Filing Certification of Publication, Hearing Exhibit A-6.

See Hearing Exhibit S-1 at 16-20.

See, Hearing Exhibit S-2, p. 2.

Also, Staff Witness E. Abinah testified that the services QCC proposes to offer are competitive. 48

3. QCC Possesses Adequate Financial, Technical, and Managerial Resources to Provide the Proposed Services.

In the First Staff Report, Staff examines QCC's financial resources from the variety of perspectives that the Commission considers for all CC&N applications, and found no objections whatsoever. Staff notes that QCC will rely on the financial resources of its parent company. Audited financial statements, with notes, were provided for the year ended December 31, 2003, for the parent corporation, Qwest Communications International, Inc., reflecting assets in excess of \$26.2 billion.⁴⁹

Staff acknowledges that QCC has the necessary authority and provides local exchange services in many states and interexchange services in virtually the entire nation. Staff found that QCC possesses the technical capabilities to provide the services it is requesting the authority to provide.⁵⁰

Staff found QCC to be financially and technically qualified without any reservations:

- Q. [Ms. Scott] Could you please summarize your findings and recommendations with respect to the Applicant's technical and financial capability to provide service in the state.
- A. [Mr. Bostwick] As far as the technical and financial capabilities, I found QCC and its parent suitable for granting them a license to provide the services that they requested, basically resold local exchange, facilities-based local exchange, and resold long distance.

⁴⁸ TR, Vol. II at 245.

See, Hearing Exhibit S-1, p. 3-4.

See, Hearing Exhibit S-1, p. 3. See also, testimony of Staff witness E. Abinah, TR, Vol. II at 244-245.

TR, Vol. I at 111 (lines 13-25). See also Tr. Vol. II at 244-245.

4. Posting of Performance Bond is Required After the Grant of the Requested CC&N.

The obligation to post a performance bond arises subsequent to the grant of the CC&N. Staff has recommended that QCC post a \$135,000 performance bond, only a slight increase from the current \$100,000 performance bond QCC has posted.⁵² QCC has not refused to post the recommended bond.

5. QCC's Proposed Rates Are Just and Reasonable.

Staff examined QCC's tariff and proposed price list rates, and concluded that QCC's rates are reasonable and should be approved.⁵³

6. QCC's Application Passes Muster with Regard to All Other Matters Typically Examined by the Commission.

QCC has met all of the requirements of the Commission's rules regarding CC&Ns for competitive services. Additionally, in the First Staff Report, Staff examined the Application in the context of the other issues the Commission typically considers, including directory listings and directory assistance, number portability, universal service, quality of service, access to alternative local exchange service providers, 911 service, custom local area signaling services, and equal access for interexchange carriers. Additionally, Staff examined QCC regarding complaints and lawsuits. Staff made no findings or recommendations that would support disqualification of QCC.

7. QCC Is in Compliance with Commission Decision 66612, and Section 272 of the Act.

In addition to the Commission's rules, and the matters described above which are typically examined by the Commission in a CC&N proceeding, the Hearing Division asked Staff to report on several other matters, specifically relating to QCC:⁵⁴ Staff was

See Hearing Exhibit S-1 at 4. See Hearing Exhibit S-1at 12.

Procedural Order (Feb. 1, 2005).

instructed to address QCC's compliance with the requirements of Decision No. 66612, the scope and status of the joint federal / state independent audit required of QCC's affiliate QC regarding its separate competitive affiliates under Section 272 of the Act, and whether the reaffirmation of the limited waiver of the Commission's Affiliate Interest Rules (granted in Decision No. 64654) should be revised in light of this Application. The matter of the waiver is discussed in Section III.D, *infra*.

In regard to QCC's compliance with the requirements of Decision No. 66612, the First Staff Report finds no substantive non-compliance, and states that Staff is not aware of any complaint filed by another carrier against QCC and/or QC alleging anticompetitive conduct. Regarding the joint Section 272 audit, Staff has docketed the Ernst & Young Report on the first biennial audit with the Commission. Staff stated no irregularities from that Section 272 audit report, and reports that no one has filed comments on that audit report.

B. Restrictions and Conditions Proposed by Staff in Excess of Those Provided by Rule or Imposed on Other Carriers Should be Denied Because They Are Not Authorized By Law and Violate Principles of Equal Protection.

The Commission's powers and duties are limited to those declared in the Arizona

See Hearing Exhibit S-1, Section 2.6 at 5. See also, TR, Vol. I at 121-122. In Decision No. 66612, the Commission ordered Staff to monitor QCC's filings of copies of any and all contracts and/or agreements, written or verbal, between QCC and its affiliates to ensure that QCC and its affiliates are not engaging in anticompetitive behavior (see Finding of Facts, No. 59). Also, QCC is required to submit copies to Staff of its contracts and agreements with its affiliates within thirty days of execution. Staff states:

Staff has reviewed QC's website and determined that contract and/or agreements with its affiliate, QCC, are listed on QC's website. In addition, Staff has reviewed the execution date and the date submitted of a sample of the contracts and/or agreements to ensure QCC's filings are submitted within thirty days. Staff has informed QCC, in writing, that four of the sample contracts and/or agreements were filed late. At this time, Staff is not aware of any complaint filed by another carrier against QCC and/or AC alleging anticompetitive conduct.

See Hearing Exhibit S-1, Section 2.7 at 6. See also, TR, Vol. I at 6.

Constitution and implementing statutes.⁵⁷ In this regard, Arizona courts have long held that it is the Legislature, and not the Commission, that has the "paramount power" to regulate in areas other than ratemaking:

[T]he paramount power to make all rules and regulations governing public service corporations not specifically and expressly given to the commission by some provision of the Constitution rests in the legislature[.]⁵⁸

Equally well established is the fact that the Legislature retains the "paramount power" to regulate the granting and withdrawal of the right to operate a utility in Arizona--that is, certificates of convenience and necessity--because such regulation has nothing to do with the Commission's ratemaking authority.⁵⁹

Accordingly, The Commission's power to grant a CC&N is therefore limited. *Trico*, 92 Ariz. at 381, 377 P.2d at 315. The Legislature has enacted statutes that authorize the Commission to investigate all applicants for a certificate of convenience and necessity for a given area (*see* A.R.S. §§ 40-281 to 285), and to issue a certificate upon a showing that the issuance to a particular applicant would serve the public interest. ⁶⁰

The Commission has, in turn, established rules to provide notice of the criteria that will be applied in determining whether or not the issuance of a CC&N to an applicant will serve the public interest. Specifically, through the promulgation of A.A.C. R14-2-1106, the Commission has established the standards for reviewing an application for a CC&N.⁶¹ Under the rule, the Commission must approve the request for a CC&N unless one of five

See US WEST Communications, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Com'n, 197 Ariz. 16, 23 28, 3 P.3d 936, 943 (App. 1999); Application of Trico Elec. Co-op, Inc., 92 Ariz. 373, 381, 377 P.2d 309, 315 (1962).

⁵⁸ Corporation Comm'n v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 54 Ariz. 159, 176, 94 P.2d 443, 450 (1939).

See Tonto Creek Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 177 Ariz. 49, 56, 864 P.2d 1081, 1088 (App. 1993).

James P. Paul Water Co. V. Arizona Corporation Commission, 137 Ariz. 426, 429,

James P. Paul Water Co. V. Arizona Corporation Commission, 137 Ariz. 426, 429, 671 P.2d 404, 407 (1983). See also, Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Sun Valley Bus Lines, 70 Ariz. 65, 216 P.2d 404 (1950).

See U.S. WEST, 197 Ariz. at 23 32, 3 P.3d at 944 ("Rule R14-2-1106 sets forth the grounds for denying CC&Ns and sets conditions to the CC&Ns that are issued.").

express conditions is shown through evidence presented at a hearing. *See, supra* at 14-18. A review of these criteria demonstrates that the standard for approval, as established by the Commission, is a "no harm" standard (i.e., there will be "no harm" or a "lack of detriment" to the public).⁶²

Thus, unless the Commission determines that one or more of the five criteria set forth in the rule exists, the application must be approved as it is in the public interest. For example, if the applicant possesses adequate financial resources and technical competency to provide the proposed services, has provided all information requested, and can provide a performance bond, the Commission cannot reject the application or use its authority to impose conditions on the applicant or the affiliate in exchange for granting approval.

In this case, Staff conceded that QCC had met all of the requirements under the rule. As demonstrated above, Staff admitted that QCC had the technical and financial capabilities required to provide service to the area at issue. Moreover, QCC provided a complete application and all information required, as evidenced by the letter of sufficiency issued by Staff. QCC has not refused to post a performance bond. Finally, the services to be offered by QCC under the proposed CC&N are "competitive," as discussed in Section III. A. 2 *supra*.

Despite this uncontroverted evidence, Staff has recommended that separate conditions be imposed on QCC and its affiliate QC. In making such a recommendation, Staff wholly abandoned the standards established in the statutes governing CC&Ns and A.A.C. R14-2-1106. Instead of addressing whether the five-part test in the rule had been satisfied, Staff determined that approval of QCC's application would serve the public interest only if the conditions were imposed. When examined, Staff acknowledged that it

See Pueblo del Sol Water co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 160 Ariz. 285, 286, 772
 P.2d 1138, 1140 (App. 1980); Arizona Public Service Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 149 Ariz. 239, 242, 717 P.2d 918, 921 (App. 1985).

had recommended the imposition of many of these conditions to analyze the state of competition for purposes of hypothetical future QC AFOR proceedings; among other reasons discussed *infra* at Section III.C.5 at 30. Nowhere do these matters appear in the rule or otherwise. Instead, Staff relies upon overly broad and general policy statements and hypothetical scenarios without making any connection to the application before it.⁶³

Staff's recommendations also violate QCC's equal protection rights because they treat QCC differently than other CLECs without any rational justification. The Arizona Constitution, Art. II, § 13, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution both guarantee citizens, including QCC, equal protection under the law. These equal protection clauses guarantee citizens like treatment to all other similarly situated unless there is a sufficient justification for disparate treatment.⁶⁴

QCC and the other CLECs that are already authorized and providing the service for which QCC seeks authorization, are similarly situated. They are all telecommunications services providers qualified under the Commission's statutes and rules to provide service to Arizona customers. They are all public service corporations that provide the same type of telecommunications service. They all seek to sell these services and make a profit. The only difference between QCC and these CLECs is that QCC is an affiliate of QC. Staff's recommendations fail even the most lenient equal protection test. 65

In short, it is apparent that Staff simply ignored the criteria stated in the rule, and is using this proceeding as an attempt to arbitrarily impose additional regulatory requirements on QCC and QC.

TR, Vol, I at 179 (lines 15-25); id. at 180 (lines 1-25); id. at 181 (lines 1-5); id. at

of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

^{185 (}lines 9-25); id. at 186 (lines 1-25).

See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); State v. Beckerman, 168 Ariz. 451, 453 (App. 1991).

See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 78, 688 P.2d 961, 970 (1984). See also, City

C. Alternatively, Each of Staff's Proposed Recommended Restrictions Are Unreasonable and Should be Denied.

In the alternative to denial of Staff's recommended restrictions and conditions based on the reasons stated in Section III. B *supra*, and without waiver of those claims, QCC states that each of Staff's proposals should be denied because they are unnecessary or unreasonable.

1. Staff's Recommended Restriction in the First Staff Report—To Totally Bar QCC from Providing Local Exchange Services Inside QC Service Area—Is Illogical and Unreasonable in Light of Staff's Conclusion That the Public Interest is Served by Permitting QCC to Provide Services to Enterprise Customers in Those Areas.

In the First Staff Report, Staff recommended a complete restriction against QCC providing local exchange service inside the ILEC service area. Apparently, Staff has abandoned that restriction, which was embodied in condition 19, in favor of the recommendations contained in the Second Staff Report. That is not entirely clear, however, because Staff continues to describe the Second Staff Report as an "alternative" recommendation to the Commission. Regardless, Staff's original restriction against QCC providing local service inside the ILEC's service area cannot be logically reconciled with the Second Staff Report. As noted above, in the First Staff Report, Staff recommends that QCC should not be certificated to provide local exchange inside the ILEC's local service area. That cannot be a viable "alternative recommendation" when Staff has subsequently found that the interests of competition and the public interests⁶⁷ would be served by QCC providing service to Enterprise customers in those same areas. It would be illogical for the Commission to totally bar QCC from serving inside QC service area when the evidence shows that the public interest is served by permitting QCC to serve Enterprise customers in that same area. For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons QCC stated in

See Hearing Exhibit S-2 at 2-3.

⁶⁶ See TR, Vol. I at 166 (lines 11-20).

its Response to Staff Report (*see* Exhibit A attached hereto), Staff's recommendation in the First Staff Report (that QCC should initially be approved to provide [facilities-based or resale local exchange] service in exchanges where ILECs other than QC are providing telephone services, (*see* Section 3.1 at 11 and Section 6.1 at 23 ¶ 19), should be rejected.

2. Staff's Recommendation That QCC Should Not Be Permitted to File an Application to Amend Its Certification For 24 Months Should be Denied Because It Is Unreasonable and Would Deny QCC's Rights to Due Process of Law.

Despite the fact that the Application now before the Commission does not ask for the right to provide local exchange services to residential and small business customers in the ILEC's service area, Staff refuses to withdraw its recommendation that QCC should be barred, by Commission order, from applying for an amendment to its certification for two years. Staff does not cite any statute or rule supporting such heavy-handed treatment, which amounts to nothing more than an injunction against QCC's exercise of its rights.

It is hard to imagine a justification for such a draconian measure, and Staff's attempts to do so fall far short. It is clear that Staff opposes granting QCC the right to service residential and small business customers in the ILEC service area, and wants to be sure that QCC does not seek such authority in the near or intermediate term future. The question at this point is entirely hypothetical—QCC is not requesting such authority. However, should it ever arise in the next two years, Staff wants to cut-off the legal processes that are available to any other entity desiring such authority. Not only does

Id., Section III.3 at 7.

⁶⁹ Cross-examination of Staff Witness E. Abinah:

Q. You don't know of your own knowledge whether or not QCC will ever file an application to expand its Certificate of Convenience and necessity, do you?

A. You know, no, I don't. But in order to make sure that QCC does not turn around and file an application to provide service to residential customers in QC's territory, we believe this provision is appropriate.

TR, Vol. I at 206 (lines 15-23).

Staff want to cut-off QCC's right to file for such authority, Staff wants the Commission to dictate now, in this proceeding, in which the matter was not at issue, what new, non-rule-based criteria QCC would have to meet in order to gain such authority, when, and if, QCC ever does file such a petition.

If that breathtaking attempt to deny QCC its rights were not problem enough, certain of the 18 month's worth of record-keeping and reporting that Staff would require before it would consider an amendment to QCC's certificate to add residential and small business⁷⁰, have nothing whatsoever to do with residential and small business service, customers, or markets. Since throughout those 18 months QCC will only be serving Enterprise customers, the data Staff would have QCC compile and report pursuant to its conditions in paragraphs 8.a. and 8.b.1-3, will only reflect Enterprise customer lines, accounts and revenues.

A.R.S. § 40-282(C) provides that the Commission may only attach conditions to a request for a CC&N extension that public convenience and necessity require. *See also, Trico Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Corporation Commission*, 86 Ariz. 27, 339 P.2d 1046 (1959) (noting that any such conditions may not be unreasonable or unlawful, and the public interest is the controlling factor). The CC&N sought by QCC is not exclusive. Any future extension sought by QCC similarly would not be exclusive. Staff's proposed moratorium serves no purpose since it simply bans one competitor from entering the market.

Moreover, Staff's proposed condition to place a two-year moratorium on QCC for any CC&N expansion is against public policy. Arizona's public policy is to encourage competition in telecommunication services. A.R.S. § 40-281. Placing a two-year

See Hearing Exhibit S-2 at 7 ("Any application by QCC shall be accompanied by at lest 18 months of the data identified in paras. 8 and 9 below which period shall commence from the date the Commission issues its order in this case.").

moratorium on QCC's ability to expand service to what is already a competitive arena is anti-competitive, and discriminatory. Staff's recommendation again violates principles of equal protection in that it would have QCC treated differently from similarly situated competitors for no legitimate state interest. *See* discussion *supra* at 18-21. It further violates QCC's right to due process because even though the Company may have a legitimate basis for requesting a CC&N extension as provided by statue and rule, it would be barred from having its request heard and decided on the merits. *See* A.R.S. § 40-282.

For the foregoing reasons, Staff's recommended conditions stated in the Second Staff Report, Section III.3., must be denied.

3. <u>Section 253 of the Act Prohibits Staff's Proposed Restrictions Against QCC Providing Local Exchange Services.</u>

As part of the Act's scheme to end the regime of state-sanctioned monopolies in local telephone service, the Act provides that "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of *any entity* to provide any interstate or *intrastate* telecommunications service." Each of the two Staff-recommended restrictions discussed immediately above (the complete bar against residential and small business service from the First Staff Report, or the 24-month injunction against filing from the Second Staff Report) are proscribed by Section 253.

Staff may claim that because QCC is affiliated with local exchange service provider QC by common ownership, Qwest as a whole is not prohibited from providing intrastate services under the Staff's proposed restrictions. However, that argument must fail because of the broad sweep of the words "any entity" in Section 253. As discussed supra at 7, QCC is a business, for-profit corporation incorporated separately from QC. QCC operates independently from the BOC QC, has separate officers and directors, and

⁷¹ 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (emphasis added).

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separate books of account. QCC may not obligate QC for QCC's indebtedness, and may not encumber OC's assets. Indeed, the existence and separateness of OCC is required by Section 272, which was enacted together with Section 253. It would be surpassingly strange that an entity that must be established according to one part of the Act (Section 272) is not among those contemplated by the phrase "any entity" under another part of the Act (Section 253).

Staff states that it is "mindful" of the provisions of Section 253(a). Staff goes on to state that it believes the recommendations it makes come within the savings clause of Section 253(b).⁷² "Staff believes that its recommendations in this case are necessary to protect the development of competition in OC's service territory and ensure that all providers are treated on a competitively neutral basis". 73 In the Second Staff Report, Staff expands on its view of Section 253(b):

In Staff's opinion, the Commission has the discretion to determine the nature and timing of the local exchange entry by a CLEC affiliate within the ILEC's service territory so this can be accomplished in a competitively neutral manner and without having competition harmed within the local market in QC's service area.

There are obvious problems with Staff's position. First, Staff's concern regarding development of competition in OC's service territory, and the timing of market entry by any entity, are not among the public policy concerns enumerated in Section 253(b). Second, in the context of the Application now before the Commission, and the Second Staff Report, the Staff is on the record⁷⁵ that OCC's entry into the Enterprise Market will

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72 47 U.S.C. § 253(b) states: STÅTE RÉGULATORY AUTHORITY.--Nothing in this section

shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a competitively neutral basis 23 and consistent with section 254, requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the

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74 Hearing Exhibit S-2 at 1. 75

See supra at Section III.A.2.

Hearing Exhibit S-1 at 11.

of consumers.

continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights

be good for competition in that market and not harmful.

Assuming arguendo Staff's proposed restrictions are consistent with the public policy concerns that form the basis of the savings clause in Section 253(b), the restrictions are not competitively neutral, and therefore may not be applied. Under either of the Staff's proposed restrictions, QCC will be barred from providing local exchange service to all or to large segments of customers in the QC service area. The Commission has not similarly denied any other carrier permission to provide local exchange service in those same areas, and it would be patently offensive to the competitive neutrality provisions of Section 253 for it to deny QCC's application. "Competitively neutral" as it appears in 47 U.S.C. § 253(b) has been interpreted to mean that any regulation that "creat[es] unnecessary competitive inequities among telecommunications providers" is unlawful. RT Comme'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F. 3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm'n., 184 F.3d 88, 105 (1st Cir. 1999). Assuming that the commission has granted CC&Ns to similarly situated CLECs, or even to CLECs that have less technical and/or financial capabilities than QCC, its denial of Qwest's CC&N request undermines the competitive-neutrality requirement of Section 253(b). The Commission cannot deny some carriers CC&Ns and thereby place those carriers at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other carriers. RT Commc'ns, 201 F.3d at 1268-69 (unlawful to grant incumbent local exchange carriers market access while saddling new entrants with different rules for market entry); US WEST Commc'ns v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 1999) (not competitively neutral to require new entrants alone to bear costs from which other carriers are exempt).

Staff attempts to divert the Commission's attention from the non-neutrality of its recommendations by pointing to CC&N applications involving rural ILECs that have sought to have their CLEC affiliates certificated. Staff states that the Commission has previously denied the application of the affiliates of such other LECS to provide local

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exchange service inside the service area of the affiliated LEC.⁷⁶ However, besides ignoring whether the Commission's actions in those matters pass muster under Section 253, Staff's comparison of QCC's Application to the Commission's orders in those other circumstances fails to consider the relative competitive impacts. The point is best made by reference to the Qwest testimony on the point:

Q. The Staff has stated in this proceeding that the Commission has previously denied the application of the affiliates of other LECs to provide local exchange service inside the service area of the affiliated LEC. Please state your view of the public policy considerations of those other proceedings as contrasted to the QCC application.

A. We believe that the state's denial of a CC&N to the affiliate of the non-BOC LECs to provide local exchange service inside the ILECs service area is contrary to the goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and specifically contrary to Section 253 of the Act. Beyond that, however, the situations are strikingly different from this case, and for that additional reason should not be held up as the public policy standard in Arizona.

First, it is important to take into account the demography of Arizona and compare the population centers to the service areas of the different ILECs. It is apparent that the largest market opportunity is inside the QC service area. When Valley Telecom's CLEC affiliate is precluded from providing service to Willcox, it is still able to compete for the opportunity to provide service to 99% of the population of Arizona. Compare that to QCC: If QCC is precluded from serving inside QC's area, QCC is precluded from serving probably 90% of the Arizona population. The degree of preclusion that is worked on the applicant is slight to the affiliate of the independent telco, but is virtually total to the affiliate of the BOC.

Second, the independent telephone companies whose affiliates have sought local exchange CC&Ns from this Commission enjoy an exemption from the provisions of Section 251(c). Under the rural exemption, those LECs do not have to open their networks to competitors by providing unbundled network elements, collocation, or resale at wholesale rates. Thus, those independent telephone companies are not facing the same degree or type of competition that QC faces in its service areas. To the extent that the Commission might have looked for a healthy level of competition as a reason to grant a CC&N to an affiliate of an ILEC, there was not likely any significant competition present in those cases. As discussed above, in the case of QC in the enterprise market, there is healthy competition. Therefore, there is a factual difference, in that there is high competition in the case of QC, where there was none in the case of the other ILECs.

Hearing Exhibits S-1 at 11. See also, TR, Vol I. at 182-183. Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 8-9.

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Thus, it is clear that QCC, *like no other CLEC, will be foreclosed from large* market segments under the recommendation contained in either Staff Report, a result that would be decidedly disparate from the standpoint of competition.

4. The Conditions that Staff Recommends Be Placed On QC Are Inappropriate For a QCC CC&N.

In their conditions listed under Section 8.b. of the Second Staff Report, to which QCC objects substantively, as well as the conditions 2, 5, 6 and 7, to which QCC objects because QC is not a party to this proceeding, Staff seeks to impose obligations on QC. While QCC and QC are indeed affiliated by common ownership, as established above they are separate and distinct entities operationally and legally. The Commission may not burden QCC's CC&N with conditions on QC.

QC did not intervene in this case. QC was not joined in this case. QC did not appear by counsel in this case. Staff did not request that QC be ordered to appear in this case, and no order was issued causing QC to appear. Staff testimony indicates that Staff believes that QC and QCC are the "same company," but offers as the only proof of that assertion that certain individuals represent each company at the Commission.⁷⁸

It is elementary that an entity that is not a party to a case cannot be bound by an order arising out of the case. If Staff wished to litigate matters involving QC, it should have properly brought QC before the Commission. Staff did not do so. Accordingly, because QC was not a party to this case, it is unlawful to burden QCC's CC&N with the conditions on QC that Staff recommends.

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Direct Testimony of Staff Witness E. Abinah, TR, Vol. I at 177.

- 5. Conditions 8.b.1-5 that Staff Recommends Placed On OC Are Unreasonable and Should be Denied.
 - Staff's Primary Purpose for the Data—Future Use in a OC AFOR a. Proceeding—Is an Improper Purpose in this Proceeding.

Staff seeks to impose on QC certain record-generation and reporting requirements relating to the number of business accounts, business lines, and annualized revenues that move from OC to OCC. 79 Staff acknowledges that the information it seeks will not be used to determine whether QCC is a fit and proper applicant for the CC&N, or to determine whether OCC is providing adequate service. 80 Rather, Staff sees the information "as being important to the future [QC] AFOR price cap proceeding."81 However, as Staff acknowledges, the AFOR proceeding would be a OC case, not a OCC case, and in that context Staff would look at the revenue for potential imputation to OC.82 Again, Staff inappropriately ties together different entities and different cases. In making this request, Staff mixes a party and a non-party, an error that is compounded in this instance by the fact that the proceeding here proceeds from a fundamentally different matter (a competitive CC&N) from the distant future AFOR matter (a rate case).

- b. Staff's Conditions in 8.b.1-3 Are Unreasonably Vague and Burdensome, and Ineffective for the Intended Purpose; Less Burdensome Alternatives Have Been Ordered by the Iowa Board of Utilities Pursuant to a General Rulemaking When It Considered this Same Issue.
 - 1) Discussion of Staff's Proposed Record-Keeping and Reports

Staff wants OC to provide reports, every six months for 3 years, concerning the business accounts, lines, and revenues it loses to QCC. However, Staff does not know whether QC tracks the data Staff seeks, and has not undertaken any analysis of how

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⁷⁹ See supra at n. 40.

⁸⁰ See Cross-examination of Staff Witness A. Fimbres, TR, Vol. I at 131. 81

See id. at 132. 82

See id. at 135.

difficult it would be for either QC or QCC to begin tracking the data.⁸³ In fact, the evidence is that those reporting requirements will require a new record-keeping effort; current systems used by QC do not have the capability to track in that manner, and "it would take an extraordinary amount of time and money through IT changes to even implement the tracking of the information."⁸⁴

Beyond the expense QC would incur to track the data, there is a risk of intangible costs to competition as well. QCC raised the issue that in order for QC to create the data in 8.b.1-3, it will have to ask a disconnecting customer where the customer is taking its business, noting that competitors could question whether such questioning by QC is anti-competitive.⁸⁵

Staff's request is vague. It is not clear whether the reports Staff requests in 8.b.1-3 are snapshots in time, or whether QC must track customers' wanderings between QC and QCC and potentially other carriers for three years.⁸⁶

Aside from the cost of the record-generation, the chilling effect the gathering of the data may have on competition, and the vagueness of Staff's request, it is clear from the record that the data has doubtful value in relation to the purposes Staff articulates. First, the data Staff requests will not enable Staff to understand the effect QCC's business has on the revenue of QC. Because the Enterprise Market is competitive, customers are not locked into QC as a provider. Enterprise customers are free to choose from among a number of telecom service providers and many have already chosen providers other than QC.⁸⁷ Second, the customers can be expected to move their business between and among

⁸³ See id. at 146.

See Supplemental Rebuttal Testimony of QCC Witness M. Lafave, Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 18 (lines 20-22). See also, Cross-examination of Qwest Witness M. Lafave, TR, Vol. II at 298-299.

See Cross-examination of Qwest Witness M. LaFave, TR, Vol. I at 63-64.

See Supplemental Rebuttal Testimony of QCC Witness M. Lafave, Hearing

Exhibit A-10 at 18 (lines 13-18).

See Supplemental Rebuttal Testimony of QCC Witness M. Lafave, Hearing

QC, QCC, and the other CLECs. No move is permanent; they are free to move their business multiple times. The testimony of the QCC witness explains it well:

[L]et's just say QC loses a million dollars in revenue. Of that, at some point in time a portion of that may have gone to QCC, but that also may have been migrated to SBC or AT&T. The nature of a competitive market is that individuals, enterprises, in this instance have a choice, and they tend to exercise that choice. So even if QCC is successful on one day, they may in turn lose that business to another competitor that's still going to have the same adverse impact on the revenues that QC at one time had.⁸⁸

Because of customer movement between and among QC, other CLECs, and QCC, the data Staff requests is ineffective to give Staff a true picture of competition, because it only tracks one narrow category of competitive motion-that of customers from QC to QCC at some point in time over a three year period. Staff puts on blinders to all other competitive customer movements and to subsequent customer changes, and the data it seeks cannot adequately prove any effects QCC's entry has on QC-or give an accurate picture of competition in the market.

2) The Iowa Reporting Alternative

Thus it is clear that the scheme of record-keeping and reporting proposed in Staff's Second Report, Section III.8.b.1-3 is seriously flawed and should not be adopted. However, QCC has pointed out an alternative data reporting plan that is viable. ⁹⁰ In December, 2004, the Iowa Utilities Board ("Iowa Board") granted QCC's application for an amendment to its competitive local exchange carrier certificate that would allow it to provide service inside the QC local exchange service territory. At the same time, the Iowa Board indicated that it would initiate a general rulemaking, applicable to not just QC, but

Exhibit A-10 at 17-18.

See Cross-examination of Qwest Witness M. LaFave, TR, Vol. I at 72-73. TR, Vol. I at 196 (lines 16-24).

Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 19-20. QCC filed this information in its Post-Hearing Submissions, filed May 27, 2005. The Iowa Board information is attached to the Post-Hearing Submission, marked as Exhibit 5 thereto.

any company with an affiliated ILEC and CLEC serving the same territory, to address information the Iowa Board believed it would need. The upshot was a rule in Iowa requiring "any ILEC that provides service in the same service territory as a CLEC with which it is affiliated" to provide certain information.⁹¹

The ILEC is required to file all commercial agreements, not just interconnection agreements, between the ILEC and the affiliated CLEC "as they are made." The ILEC must also file as part of its annual report the following information:

- a. The number of local numbers ported by the ILEC to nonaffiliated CLECs.
- b. The number of local numbers ported by the ILEC to its affiliated CLEC.
- c. The number of unbundled network element loops (UNE-Ls) provided by the ILEC to nonaffiliated CLECs.
- d. The number of UNE-Ls provided by the ILEC to its affiliated CLEC.
- e. The number of unbundled network element platforms (UNE-Ps), or their equivalent, provided by the ILEC to nonaffiliated CLECs.
- f. The number of UNE-Ps, or their equivalent, provided by the LEC to its affiliated CLEC.
- g. The number of resale access lines provided by the ILEC to nonaffiliated CLECs.
- h. The number of resale access lines provided by the ILEC to its affiliated CLEC.
- i. The number of central office collocation sites provided by the ILEC to nonaffiliated CLECs.
- j. The number of central office collocation sites provided by the ILEC to its

Íowa Affiliate Reporting Order, at 2; 199 Iowa Adminstrative Code § 31.4(1).

In re: Revisions to Affiliate Reporting Rules [199 IAC 31], Docket No. RMU-05-3, Order Adopting Amendment, May 17, 2005 (hereinafter "Iowa Affiliate Reporting Order"), at 1.

affiliated CLEC.93

QCC respectfully suggests that these reporting requirements are far better than those recommended by Staff. These reporting requirements involve data that is captured in the normal course of business, so the expense of developing new record systems can be avoided. Second, this reporting provides data regarding competitive line loss/gain or growth for all CLECs, which gives Staff comparative data. Third, this procedure is the correct one because it was adopted by way of a rulemaking applicable to all carriers.

c. Staff's Conditions in 8.b. 4. Are Unreasonable; the Purposes for the Reports Do Not Relate to this Case

In the Second Staff Report, Section III.8.b.4, Staff recommends that every 6 months QC provide state-wide summarized listing data, containing all main listings and additional line listings by QC, QCC, CLECs ILECs, Wireless Providers or Other for each NPA-NXX, separated by residence and business. The reasons Staff gives for wanting this information are inadequate.

Staff initially stated that the reason it seeks this data is to determine if QC, the ILEC, was serving outside its service territory. This is symptomatic of the greater problem in this matter--Staff wants to use this case for any number of issues and concerns other than the single question of whether QCC is a fit and proper applicant. Here, Staff seeks to impose on a CC&N a reporting requirement that Staff will use to evaluate the compliance of a company other than the applicant, in a subject unrelated to the Application.

Staff states two other reasons for the state-wide listings data. However, they are not persuasive either. First, Staff will look at the data to see if any of QCC's telephone

Iowa Affiliate Reporting Order, at 2; 199 Iowa Administrative Code § 31.4(2).

See Supplemental Rebuttal Testimony of Mary F. LaFave, Hearing Exhibit A-10 at

See Cross-Examination of Staff Witness A. Fimbres, TR, Vol. I at 137-138.

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numbers are in the residence category. Thus, Staff sees this as a compliance check. However, that does not answer the question of why QC should routinely produce the data, and it does not answer the question of why the listings data should cover every provider or wireline and wireless state-wide. Staff is over-reaching.

The final inadequate reason Staff seeks the state-wide listings data is for Staff to analyze the state of competition⁹⁶ with a view toward the next QC AFOR case.⁹⁷ This Staff purpose does not have anything to do with QCC, its fitness, or this CC&N. In this instance, Staff will use the data to evaluate competition on an area by area basis, to figure out the extent which that area is competitive. This is an improper purpose in this case. Staff should take this subject up in a future QC AFOR case, or in a generic docket dealing with the status of competition. See Generic Investigation of Competition in Arizona *Telecommunications Markets*. Docket No. T-000001-04-0749.

> d. Staff's Conditions in 8.b. 5 Are Unreasonable; the Purposes for the Reports Do Not Relate to this Case; Staff Can Subscribe to the LERG to Obtain Data.

In the Second Staff Report, Section III.8.b.5, Staff recommends that every 6 months OC must provide state-wide summarized Local Exchange Routing Guide ("LERG") detailed information for all switches in the state, for all switch owners in the state, including all NPA NXXs assigned to each switch. Staff's rationale for this LERG data report is much the same as its reasons for the state-wide listings data--to evaluate the state of competition in Arizona, with a view toward a future QC AFOR case. 98 Staff's request should be denied for the same reasons as stated above.

With regard to the LERG data however, there is another reason Staff's request is unreasonable. The evidence shows that Staff, as an arm of a state regulatory agency, may

⁹⁶ See id.; TR, Vol. I at 139-140. See id.; TR, Vol. I at 143-144. 97

⁹⁸ See id.

subscribe directly to the LERG, and that such access is often times free of charge by the database maintenance organization, Telcordia.⁹⁹

D. The Limited Waiver of Rule 803 Previously Granted to Qwest Should Not Be Altered; Rule 803's Purposes Are Well-Served.

By Procedural Order, issued on July 11, 2005, the ALJ asked the parties to address the following question:

If Staff's recommendations in its supplemental Staff Report are adopted, why is it unnecessary for the Commission to look at the current waiver from the affiliated interest rules held by QCC's parent Qwest Corporation ("Qwest"), given that Qwest's competitive affiliate would be allowed to compete head-to-head for Qwest's regulated business? In responding to this question, the parties should address the purpose of the affiliated interests rules, and what the risk and benefits are of keeping the waiver in place.

1. The Purpose of the Affiliated Interests Rules and the History of the Limited Waiver, Which Has Been in Effect Since 1992.

Taken as a whole, the essential purpose of the affiliated interests rules is to prevent utilities from endangering their assets through transactions with affiliates. The affiliated interests rules primarily consist of 3 rules, codified in the Arizona Administrative Code as R14-2-803, 804 and 805. A.A.C. R14-2-803 ("Rule 803") governs the organization or reorganization of public utility holding companies, and provides that the Commission shall be notified of and approve, of the organization or reorganization of a public utility holding company. A.A.C. R14-2-804 ("Rule 804") requires Commission review of transactions between public utilities and affiliates and requires Commission approval of certain such transactions. A.A.C. R14-2-805 ("Rule 805") imposes certain annual filing requirement of diversification activities and plans. The limited waiver in question has been in place for Qwest since 1992. As discussed

Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 20 (lines 18-22); TR, Vo II at 309.

See Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 2, and Hearing Exhibit S-5 at 2.

The waiver in question was granted under Commission Decision No. 58087 in 1992 to the BOC U S WEST Communications, Inc. (now named Qwest Corporation) and ultimate parent company U S WEST, Inc. (now named Qwest Communications International Inc.). Subsequently, in 2002 the Commission examined the appropriateness

below, it is a limited waiver of the requirements of Rule 803 only. The limited waiver does not extend to Rules 804 and 805.

2. OCC's Application Does Not Implicate Rule 803 or the Limited Waiver; No Reason Exists to Re-examine the Limited Waiver.

Rule 803 applies to "any utility or affiliate intending to organize a public utility holding company or reorganize an existing public utility holding company." ¹⁰² The term "reorganize" is defined in the affiliated interests rules:

"Reorganize" or "Reorganization." The acquisition or divestiture of a financial interest in an affiliate or a utility or reconfiguration of an existing affiliate or utility's position in the corporate structure or the merger or consolidation of an affiliate or a utility. 103

Staff¹⁰⁴ and QCC both conclude that QCC's request to compete is not a reorganization under the rules. The pending QCC Application does not involve a change in the corporate structure of the Qwest companies. QCC already exists; no merger or consolidation is involved. 105 Furthermore, the capital needs of QC, and the current methods of capitalization will not need to be changed when OCC proceeds with its business plan; there will be no assignment or conveyance of customers or revenues from QC to QCC, and no transfer or lease of QC assets to QCC is involved. 106 Should there come a time when there is a "reorganization" OCC will follow the rule. As stated by Qwest's witness:

I do not foresee that there will be a proposed transaction of the type or kind about which notice of intent is required or given under Rule 803. Obviously, the Waiver does not come into play if the underlying rule does

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of the limited waiver in light of QCC's intent to provide competitive interexchange services. In Decision No. 64654 the Commission reaffirmed that the limited waiver of Rule 803 applies unaltered to QCC, QC, their affiliates and parent Qwest Communications International Inc.

A.A.C. R14-2-803(A) (emphasis added). 103

A.A.C. R14-2-801(5). 104

See Hearing Exhibit S-5 at 4, (lines 23-24). See also, TR, Vol. II at 246. 105

See Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 11 (lines 11-15). 106

See id. at 11-12.

not apply. If, there is a reorganization in the future, it will have to be noticed to the Commission if it falls outside the scope of the waiver

This is consistent with Staff's view of how the Rule 803 and the limited waiver work, as well. In 2002, in connection with the application of QCC for transfer of a CC&N from an affiliate, Staff reported favorably on how the limited waiver had worked, essentially noting that in practice the limited waiver had not screened Commission review of any significant transactions:

In its Staff Report, Staff states that the partial waiver of the Rules granted to USWCI and its affiliates indecision No. 58087 has served as a safety net through which transactions inconsequential to Arizona have passed, while larger transactions with more significant consequences to the Arizona jurisdiction have been processed. Staff listed several transactions that have required Commission approval under the limited waiver. These transactions include the USWI acquisition of a partnership interest in Time Warner Entertainment, L.P., the divestiture of USWCI's interest in Bell Communications Research, Inc., and the separation of the U S WEST Communications Group from the U S WEST Media Group.

At the hearing, the point that the limited waiver does not shield important transactions from Commission review under Rule 803 was emphasized by further examples of matters that were brought before the Commission for review and approval, including the U S WEST/Qwest merger, and the sale of the directory publishing business.¹⁰⁷

Since there is not a reorganization, Rule 803 is not implicated; since Rule 803 is not implicated, the limited waiver is not implicated, and it is unnecessary to amend the limited waiver.

3. Staff's Position that the Limited Waiver Should Be Narrowed If Staff's Proposed Conditions Are Not Adopted, Fails to Justify Those Conditions, and Is Not Rationally Connected to Rule 803.

The Commission should note here, and take comfort as it did from Staff's report 108

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See Cross-Examination of Staff Witness E. Abinah, TR, Vol. II at 247.

The Staff report urged that the Commission uphold the limited waiver without amendment, and the Commission so ordered. The Order includes findings from the Staff report that are directly relevant today in this proceeding:

recited in Decision No. 64654, that there are a number of other safeguards in place protecting QC's ratepayers and competitors. Staff now attempts, unconvincingly, to distance itself from its earlier view of the waiver, in an effort to provide some rational justification for the unreasonable conditions it recommended in the Second Staff Report. While acknowledging that there is no "reorganization" involved in QCC's Application,

- 21. Staff indicates that the restrictions and requirements that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act") sets in place concerning Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs"), such as Qwest Corporation, and their transactions with affiliates that provide competitive services, provide a layer of oversight in addition to the Rules. Section 272 of the Act will require Qwest Corporation and its competitive in-region interLATA telecommunications services provider, or "Section 272 Affiliate" to keep separate books, records and accounts, and to have separate officers, directors and employees. Section 272 of the Act will also require that all transactions between the entities are arms-length transactions. In addition, the Act prohibits a Section 272 affiliate from obtaining credit under any arrangement that would give a creditor recourse to the assets of a BOC such as Qwest Corporation.
- 22. Staff explained in the Staff Report that under the Act, a BOC with Section 272 affiliates is required to obtain and pay for a joint Federal/State audit every two years conducted by an independent auditor to determine whether the BOC has complied with Section 272 of the Act, and that the results of the audit must be submitted to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and the State commission of each state in which service is provided.
- 23. The Staff Report pointed out that in a Report and Order released on December 24, 1996, the FCC adopted accounting safeguards related to the Act. Staff stated that those safeguards prescribe how incumbent local exchange carriers such as Qwest Corporation must account for transactions with affiliates, and how costs incurred in the provision of both regulated telecommunications services and non-regulated services are allocated.
- 24. Staff believes that the previous waiver granted to USWCI in Decision 58087 has provided adequate protection of Arizona ratepayers from costs related to affiliates. Staff also believes that in the event QCII and its affiliates receive approval to provide in-region interLATA service in Arizona through a Section 272 affiliate, that Section 272 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 will provide additional protection.

Order, In the Matter of the Application of Qwest Communications Corporation for Approval of transfer of Certificates of Authority In Association With Internal Corporate Restructuring, Docket No T-01051B-01-0456, Decision No. 64654 (Ariz. Corp. Com'n, 2002), at 5-6.

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Staff states that if all of the conditions contained in Staff's alternative recommendations relating to QCC's CC&N are not adopted, Staff would seek to re-examine the limited Rule 803 waiver and recommend that the "exemption be significantly narrowed in that event so that any reorganization that was likely to have any impact upon the Arizona operations of Qwest be subject of review in the future, or that the waiver be eliminated entirely."109

QCC agrees with Staff in one very narrow sense. If there is to be a re-examination of the limited waiver, it needs to be done via a proceeding in which that question is squarely tried, and the parties have the opportunity to explore all the issues in a manner that meets fundamental due process. The Commission should not casually throw this important question on the end of a CC&N case. However, such a proceeding is unnecessary. Staff's linkage of their recommended conditions to the limited waiver and Rule 803 is artificial and illogical. As demonstrated above, the limited waiver does not foreclose review of any "reorganization" of any consequence to Arizona either now or in the future.

Staff suggests that the grant of the CC&N to QCC will raise "many of the same concerns identified by all sections of the rules, including A.A.C. R14-2-803, i.e., whether QCC's ability to take away customers from QC will 'impair the financial status of the public utility, otherwise prevent it from attracting capital at fair and reasonable terms, or impair the ability of the public utility to provide safe, reasonable and adequate service."110 The Commission must reject this side-door attempt to re-write Rule 803. QCC's winning of a customer is not a "reorganization."

Regardless, there is no foundation for Staff's assertion that QCC's business will impair the financial status of QC, otherwise prevent it from attracting capital at fair and

¹⁰⁹ See Hearing Exhibit S-5 at 5 (lines 6-17) (emphasis added). 110 See id. at 4-5.

reasonable terms, or impair its ability to provide safe, reasonable and adequate service. (See infra at Section II.E.4-5.)

- E. Granting the CC&N Will Enhance Competition in the Enterprise Market, Is Consistent With National Policy, and Is In the Public Interest.
 - 1. <u>National Telecommunications Policy Favors the Offering of Local</u> Exchange Service by BOC Section 272 Affiliates.
 - a. The FCC Ruled that "Regulations Prohibiting BOC Section 272 Affiliates From Offering Local Exchange Service Do Not Serve the Public Interest."

As noted, one of the purposes of the Act is to open local telecommunications markets to competition. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") concluded early on that those pro-competitive purposes were served by allowing BOC section 272 affiliates such as QCC to provide local exchange services:

We also conclude as a matter of policy that regulations prohibiting BOC [Bell Operating Company] section 272 affiliates from offering local exchange service do not serve the public interest. The goal of the 1996 Act is to encourage competition and innovation in the telecommunications market. We agree with the BOCs that the increased flexibility resulting from the ability to provide both interLATA and local services from the same entity serves the public interest, because such flexibility will encourage section 272 affiliates to provide innovative new services. To the extent that there are concerns that the BOCs will unlawfully subsidize their affiliates or accord them preferential treatment, we reiterate that improper cost allocations and discrimination are prohibited by existing Commission rules and sections 251, 252 and 272 of the 1996 Act, and that predatory pricing is prohibited by the antitrust laws. Our affiliate transaction rules, as modified by our companion Accounting Safeguards Order, address the BOCs' ability to engage in improper cost allocation. The rules in this Order and our rules in our First Interconnection Order and our Second Interconnection Order ensure that BOCs may not favor their affiliates. In sum, we find no basis in the record for concluding that competition in the local market would be harmed if a section 272 affiliate offers local exchange service to the public that is similar to local exchange service offered by the BOC.

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In the Matter of Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 21095, FCC Release No. 96-489, ¶ 315 (1996) ("Section 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order") (emphasis added).

The FCC's declaration is unambiguous. Adoption of Staff's proposed prohibitions against QCC, a section 272 affiliate, from offering local exchange service, is *contrary to the public interest*. As a matter of national public policy, the Commission should reject Staff's first alternative put forth in the First Staff Report, because it would prohibit QCC from providing local exchange service to any customers in a huge part of the State of Arizona. Likewise, the Commission should reject Staff's recommendation that QCC should be prohibited from filing an application to amend its certification to provide local exchange services to residence and/or small business customers in the QC service area in Arizona for a period of 24 months.

b. All Other States in QC's Region Permit QCC to Provide Local Exchange Services in QC's Service Area.

Save for this Application which is still pending, all of the other states in the 14 state region in which QC provides local exchange services have granted QCC the authorization to operate in QC service areas.¹¹² This bears out the national policy formulated by the FCC.

Two of those states, Iowa and Nebraska, have promulgated rules of general applicability to telecommunications carriers, in rulemakings distinct from the QCC certification proceedings. The Nebraska Public Service Commission ultimately adopted rules requiring any ILEC with a CLEC affiliate operating in its incumbent territory to file agreements between the ILEC and the affiliated CLEC as they are made, and also to annually file the number of resale access lines provided by the ILEC to its affiliated CLEC. The Iowa rule, which is discussed at greater length in Section III.C.5.b.2, *supra*, provides for reports to be created from systems and data that are

Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 27-29.

See id. at 28 (lines 13 et seq.).

See id. citing Order Issuing Certificate of Adoption, Rule and Regulation 164, (Nebr. PSC, June 7, 2005).

currently available. Neither state's rule supports Staff's recommended restrictions or conditions. Rather, the Nebraska and Iowa rules reflect on the unreasonableness of Staff's recommendations and the availability of efficient alternatives.

2. QCC's Entrance into the Enterprise Market Will Benefit Customers and Competition.

The evidence clearly supports QCC's entrance into the Enterprise Market because such entrance will benefit customers and enhance the competitiveness of that Market. As noted above in Section II.C. at 8, QCC seeks authorization to serve the Enterprise Market because currently no Qwest company can provide both local and interLATA services. The business purpose behind this Application is to enable the Section 272 affiliate--the only Qwest company that may legally be so enabled--to enter the market for both local exchange services and interLATA services. This is critical, because the availability to have "one-stop shopping," whereby the customer can secure a full suite of services, local and long distance, from a single provider, with a single point of contact, one bill, and a single entity responsible and accountable for performance, is very important to many Enterprise customers.

The Staff agrees that Enterprise customers "typically" want one-stop shopping. Staff agrees also that if QCC is allowed to provide service in QC's territory, Enterprise customers will have one more choice in addition to AT&T, MCI and other providers where they can get one-stop shopping, and that this development is consistent with the role of the Telecom Act and the role of this Commission to encourage competition. As Staff stated in the Second Staff Report, "The Enterprise Market may, in fact, welcome another competitor since QC's presence in the Enterprise market has substantially diminished. . . . Additional competitive alternatives for the Enterprise market appear to

See, Cross-examination of Staff witness E. Abinah, TR, Vol. IIat 248 (lines 17-19). See, Id. pp. 248-249.

have more upside than downside."117

3. The Benefits to Customers and to Competition Are the Answer to the ALJ's Question Why QCC Should Be Allowed to "Take" QC Customers.

In the Procedural Order, issued July 11, 2005, the ALJ asked the parties to address "Why should QCC be allowed to take customers and their associate revenues away from [QC]?" QCC responds in two parts; here, QCC responds to the question as it relates to "taking customers;" below QCC will address the question as it relates to revenues.

It is important to understand that QCC will have to *win over* customers. Customers will not be simply transferred, assigned or "slammed" by QCC. As was explained by QCC witness M. LaFave, "QC will not move its customers and it cannot do so legally. Rather, QCC will compete for a subscriber's business. Customers who want to switch to QCC will be entering a new provider / subscriber relationship, just as would be the case when a non-affiliate provider wins the customer's business."

More fundamentally, however, the answer to the ALJ's question is that (1) granting QCC's certificate is entirely consistent with national public policy, as discussed above, and (2) winning-over customers is exactly what happens with the advent of competitors and the development of competitive markets. QCC's answer to the ALJ's question was well-explained by QCC witness M. LaFave:

QCC should be allowed to take customers from QC and from other carriers because the national and state telecommunications policy favors innovation, customers having the ability to choose among carriers and competition. As I previously testified, the FCC specifically addressed this situation and ruled that permitting a BOC affiliate to provide both interLATA and local services from a single entity will serve the public interest by encouraging deployment of new and innovative services. Any concerns about accounting and discrimination are fully addressed by FCC accounting rules, audits under Section 272 as well as specific non-discrimination rules under Section 272.

Implicit in the Staff's argument giving rise to this question are

Hearing Exhibit S-2 at 2.

Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 21 (lines 9-14).

assumptions that the market is static and that QC is a monopoly. Neither assumption is correct. Further, the question does not recognize that the Second Supplement to the Application limits the CC&N request to the enterprise market. Because the enterprise market is competitive, enterprise customers are free to choose from among a number of telecom service providers, and a large number have already chosen providers other than QC. As Staff correctly noted in its supplemental report dated May 13, 2005, the Enterprise market is "a market segment in which it [QC] has diminished presence. Id. p. 3. Staff also concluded in its supplemental report dated May 13, 2005, "The Enterprise Market is highly competitive." Hearing Exhibits S-2, p. 2. Because enterprise customers have left QC, or may freely do so, the question is not whether QCC should be allowed to take customers from QC, but rather whether any Qwest company will be allowed to try to successfully compete in the enterprise market against large well-funded carriers that currently focus on this market segment.

4. The Effect on QC's Revenues

In the Procedural Order, issued on July 11, 2005, the ALJ asked the parties to address "If QCC is allowed to compete with QC in the local market for enterprise customers, how should QC and QCC revenues be treated from a ratemaking perspective? What will the effect be on QC's future rates and revenues?"

QCC respectfully submits that this question is not before the Commission in this CC&N proceeding, and that it is improper to bring it here. The question regarding treatment of revenues for ratemaking is clearly outside the scope of this Application. As noted by QCC witness M. LaFave,

To the extent there is a concern about the effect QCC's operations have on QC's financial condition, the appropriate venue would be before the Commission in a future wholesale cost / rates docket, rate case or AFOR proceeding where issues can be addressed on a fact specific basis taking all of the competitive effects into account, not just the consequences of QCC operations. 120

Without waiving its objection, QCC states that, as explained by witness M.

LaFave, 121 QCC's entry into the Enterprise Market will not have any impact on the revenue and financial viability of QC differently than the loss of Enterprise customers to

Id. at 23-25.

Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 21-22.

¹²⁰ Id. at 24 (lines 23-26) and at 25 (lines 1-3).

competition has had generally on QC. There is fierce competition in the Arizona market; as of July 2005, QCC calculates there were 144 providers of telecom services targeting only business customers. To the extent that those competitors provide local exchange services to their subscribers over their own facilities, QC is bypassed and receives no revenue whatsoever. To the extent that those competitors provide services to their subscribers over the facilities of QC through wholesale service arrangements, QC is compensated for that use at rates established or approved by the Commission. 123

When QCC enters the local exchange business, rather than construct new local facilities where QC has facilities, QCC will incorporate QC network facilities or services into the QCC network, through purchasing QC retail services at tariff rates, through purchasing QC services for resale, or through purchasing unbundled network elements from QC. 124

Revenues QC derives from QCC in that fashion are typically referred to as "wholesale revenue" and are a significant revenue stream. In fact, in a current proceeding before the Commission involving QC's AFOR Plan, a consultant testifying on behalf of Staff points to what the consultant calls "considerable new and growing revenues" for QC "by serving many of its departing retail customers on a wholesale basis." ¹²⁵

It is important to note that wholesale rates are established or approved by the Commission, and the Commission has found that those rates are just and reasonable, and adequately compensate QC. Regardless, the question about the treatment of the revenues must be done in a QC rate proceeding. It is wholly improper to address those issues in this QCC proceeding, and wholly improper to run this CC&N aground because of possible

Id. at 5 (lines 9-13).

Id. at 24.

See Excerpt of Surrebuttal Testimony of Michael L. Brosch, Docket No. T-01051B-03-0454, et al., Hearing Exhibit A-11 at 4.

future rate making cases.

5. Effect on QC's Maintenance

In the Procedural Order, issued on July 11, 2005, the ALJ asked the parties to address how the Commission can insure that maintenance and expansion of QC's infrastructure will not suffer as a result of allowing QCC to enter the local exchange business. As discussed, the evidence clearly shows that QC is not a monopoly, the Enterprise Market is highly competitive, and Enterprise customers have already left and are continuing to leave QC. That said, the evidence presented in response to this question compels the conclusions that competition causes QC's marginal maintenance expense to decline. As QCC witness M. LaFave points out, 126 QC's maintenance expenses are, in part, a function of the number of customers it serves. One can reasonably expect that QC's maintenance expenses will decrease as QC loses customers to other providers, regardless of whether that provider is QCC or an unaffiliated CLEC.

That consequence of competition is known to Staff, and formed the basis for testimony in QC's current AFOR case. Specifically, the consultant testifying on behalf of Staff stated in that case as follows:

With respect to competition, it is obvious that Intrastate revenues have declined considerably since the inception of the Plan, due to both volume reductions associated with competition and economic conditions as well as the price reductions implemented pursuant to the Plan. However, Qwest has managed to reduce its cost levels and maintain revenues at levels adequate to produce adequate returns on Intrastate rate base investment on after adjustments to normalize test year information. As noted above, Arizona Intrastate cash flows are strong and more than adequate to service the existing high debt levels reasonably allocated to Arizona. 127

Regardless, there are regulatory requirements and competitive pressures that compel QC to properly maintain its network in Arizona. By way of the QC Service

FENNEMORE CRAIG
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
PHOENIX

See Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 25-26.

See Excerpt of Direct Testimony of Michael L. Brosch, Docket No. T-01051B-03-0454, et al., Hearing Exhibit A-12 at 6.

Quality Tariff, the Commission has established a process for dealing with poor maintenance, including the possibility of significant financial penalties and/or credits to customers if QC's performance declines. Further, both the current AFOR plan, as well as the proposed Plan included in the Settlement Agreement in Docket No. T-01051B-03-0454, contain penalties that are in addition to those included in Owest's tariff should service quality levels decline. Second, the presence of aggressive competitors in the Arizona market requires QC to maintain a high quality of service if it is to compete successfully. This combination of regulatory oversight and competitive pressure provides adequate assurance that QC will continue to adequately maintain its network. 128 IV. **CONCLUSION** For the foregoing reasons, QCC respectfully submits that the Commission should issue its order approving QCC's Application, and should reject Staff's recommended restrictions and conditions.

See Hearing Exhibit A-10 at 25-26.

1	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this day of September, 2005.		
2	QWEST COMMUNICATIONS		
3	CORPORATION Norman G. Curtright 4041 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1100		
4	Phoenix, AZ 85012		
5	Its Attorney		
6	-and-		
7	FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.		
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13	Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2913		
14	Attorneys for Qwest Communications Corporation		
15	ORIGINAL + 13 copies filed this 30th day of September, 2005:		
16	Docket Control ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona		
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19	COPY of the foregoing delivered by hand this 30th day of September, 2005 to:		
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21	Teena Wolfe, Administrative Law Judge Hearing Division ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85007		
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EXHBIT A

BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

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2		
3	JEFF HATCH-MILLER	
4	Chairman WILLIAM MUNDELL	
5	Commissioner MARC SPITZER	
-	Commissioner	
6	MIKE GLEASON Commissioner	
7	KRISTIN MAYES Commissioner	
8	Commissioner	
9	IN THE MATTER OF THE	DOCKET NO. T-02811B-04-0313
10	APPLICATION OF QWEST	
	COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION D/B/A QWEST LONG DISTANCE FOR	
11	EXTENSION OF ITS EXISTING	
12	CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND	
13	NECESSITY TO INCLUDE AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE RESOLD AND	
14	FACILITIES-BASED LOCAL	OVEREST COLONIA NAME A TYPONG
15	EXCHANGE AND RESOLD LONG	QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION'S RESPONSE TO
į	DISTANCE SERVICES IN ADDITION TO ITS CURRENT AUTHORITY TO	STAFF REPORT
16	PROVIDE FACILITIES-BASED LONG	
17	DISTANCE SERVICES, AND PETITION	
18	FOR COMPETITIVE CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSED SERVICES WITHIN THE	
19	STATE OF ARIZONA	
20		
21	Owner Communication Communication	I ("O)" I . I . C'I . '. D
		Inc. ("Qwest") hereby files its Response to
22	the Staff Report, which was filed by the Arizo	ona Corporation Commission Staff ("Staff")
23	in this docket, pursuant to the Procedural Ord	ler dated February 1, 2005.
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I. INTRODUCTION

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As a beginning point for examining QCC's Application and Staff's Report, it is helpful to observe what is not present in this docket. First, Staff's only objection to QCC's application is to suggest that QCC should be excluded from operating in QC territory. Staff does not question QCC's technical, financial, or managerial abilities to provide competitive local exchange telephone service. Indeed, of the twenty-eight paragraphs of recommendations included in section 6.1 of the Report, only one, ¶ 19, recommends any limitations or conditions on QCC's certificate that are materially different from conditions applied to other CLECs' certificates.

Second, it is important to note that Staff's Report provides no evidence to back up any of its concerns. Staff hypothesizes five "unresolved concerns" at page 8 of its Report, but provides no evidence that QCC has engaged in any such conduct, or has the opportunity or motivation to do so. To the contrary, most of the anti-competitive behavior Staff expresses concern about is already prohibited by both Arizona and federal law. For the Commission to follow Staff's recommendation and bar QCC from competing for most customers in Arizona because of unsubstantiated fears that QCC would engage in unlawful conduct would be arbitrary, capricious, and illogical.

Third, it is notable that no competing carrier has intervened and argued that QCC's statewide presence and operation as a CLEC would be unlawful, harm competition, or be adverse to the public interest. Staff's single objection is raised in a vacuum of protest from the entities Staff claims would suffer most if QCC acted against the law: QCC's competitors. This silence of intervention speaks loudly against the credibility of the concerns Staff raises in its Report.

What is present and undisputed in QCC's application is the fact that because of their organizational limitations, QC and QCC presently are restricted from segments of the market their competitors are not: the business or governmental entity that wants interLATA services and local exchange services from a single provider, with a single point of contact, and a single bill. Permitting QCC to operate statewide, rather than providing an unfair competitive advantage as

Staff speculates, will instead level the playing field so that QCC can compete for these customers on an equal footing compared to its competitors. Adding QCC to the competitive landscape will increase competition, and therefore serves the public interest.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Staff's Proposal Effectively Excludes QCC from Competing in Arizona in Violation of 47 USC § 253.

Although Staff proposes only a single limitation on QCC's certificated authority, the condition Staff recommends would, as a practical matter, exclude QCC from the Arizona marketplace. QC incumbent territory encompasses Arizona's largest cities and the vast majority of its citizens. The territory where QC is not the incumbent is largely served by independent ILECs, many of which could refuse to sell network elements or make their retail telecommunications services available for resale at a discount to QCC pursuant to the so-called "rural exemptions" of section 251(f) of the federal Telecommunications Act (the "Act"). Thus, QCC would as a practical matter be excluded from operating as a CLEC even in the limited area for which Staff recommends approval, unless it builds its own facilities. This practical prohibition on QCC's operations would violate section 253 of the Act:

No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.

Section 253 bars states not only from prohibiting entities like QCC from providing telecommunications service, but also from regulating QCC in such a way that it has the effect of prohibiting QCC from providing telecommunications service. Staff proposes that this Commission do both.

The Staff's recommendation not only violates federal law, it is unsupported by law, policy, or the facts. In point of fact, Staff examined the relationship between QCC and QC to ensure compliance with federal law and this Commission's orders in Decision No. 66612 and

^{1 47} USC § 253.

64654, and found that both QC and QCC have largely complied with these orders.² As discussed in more detail below, Staff's recommendations are arbitrary and capricious in light of this failure of evidence. After erroneously raising its concerns, Staff then proceeds to discuss its view of the state of the law regarding Bell Operating Company ("BOC") affiliates providing competitive local exchange services in the BOCs' incumbent territory. However, that discussion provides an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the state of the law.

B. Staff's Report Inaccurately Describes Current Law.

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Staff points to paragraph 312 the FCC's 1996 Section 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order³ in connection with the contention that section 272 of the federal Act resolves some, but not all, of its listed concerns. That paragraph concludes that section 272 does not prohibit BOC affiliates from offering long distance service. Staff fails, however, to point out the FCC's discussion of affiliated CLEC competition and the public interest, three paragraphs later:

We also conclude as a matter of policy that regulations prohibiting BOC [Bell Operating Company] section 272 affiliates from offering local exchange service do not serve the public interest. The goal of the 1996 Act is to encourage competition and innovation in the telecommunications market. We agree with the BOCs that the increased flexibility resulting from the ability to provide both interLATA and local services from the same entity serves the public interest, because such flexibility will encourage section 272 affiliates to provide innovative new services. To the extent that there are concerns that the BOCs will unlawfully subsidize their affiliates or accord them preferential treatment, we reiterate that improper cost allocations and discrimination are prohibited by existing Commission rules and sections 251, 252 and 272 of the 1996 Act, and that predatory pricing is prohibited by the antitrust laws. transaction rules, as modified by our companion Accounting Safeguards Order, address the BOCs' ability to engage in improper cost allocation. The rules in this Order and our rules in our First Interconnection Order and our Second Interconnection Order ensure that BOCs may not favor their affiliates. In sum, we find no basis in the record for concluding that competition in the local market would be harmed if a section 272 affiliate offers local exchange service to the public that is similar to local exchange service offered by the BOC.

² Staff Report, at 5. Staff stated that it believed that some of the filings had been made late, but found no evidence

of any anticompetitive behavior, which was the basis for the requirement to file all affiliate contracts.

In the Matter of Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the

Communications Act of 1934, as amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 21095, FCC Release No. 96-489, ¶ 315 (1996) (Section 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order"). A copy is attached as Appendix A.

⁴ Section 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, ¶ 315 (1996)(emphasis added).

The FCC reached these conclusions in 1996 – when wireless communications barely dented the telecommunications market, before cable giants like Cox Telecom had begun to erode BOC market share, and before the Act enabled a passel of wholly and partially facilities-based carriers to use Qwest's facilities to compete for Qwest's customers. Nine years later, Staff relies on the same rejected concerns the FCC addressed in 1996, and instead of proposing an approach to regulating QCC's entry that would allow QCC to compete on relatively equal footing while making sure QC and QCC continued to follow federal and state law,⁵ Staff proposes a total ban on QCC's presence in the vast majority of Arizona.

Staff also overstates the states' laws bases for its draconian recommendation. For example, Staff argues that only "some states within Qwest's in-region footprint" (emphasis added) permit BOC CLEC affiliates to operate in BOC incumbent territory. But at the time Staff issued its Report, thirteen states where QCC has requested authority to operate in QC incumbent territory had given QCC that authority. Arizona's pending application is the only exception.

Three states, Iowa, North Dakota, and Nebraska, have directly addressed disputes regarding whether QCC should be allowed to operate in QC incumbent territory. The Iowa Utilities Board, after considering objections from the Iowa Office of the Consumer Advocate and interveners almost identical to Staff's concerns here,⁶ concluded that granting QCC authority to compete in QC territory was in the public interest.⁷ In North Dakota, the Public Service Commission determined that allegations of consumer confusion were largely unfounded in view

⁵ Such an approach would be consistent with paragraph 317 of the Section 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, which permits states to regulate such CLECs differently than other carriers. No FCC ruling or other law permits the Staff recommendation of abandoning "regulation" altogether and barring QCC from QC incumbent territory outright.

⁶ Those objections included that competition between affiliates is not true, "arms length," or effective competition; that any loss of customers by Qwest to QCC would reflect a migration policy of the consolidated entity accomplished through a joint marketing program which does not distinguish between regulated and non-regulated operations; that customers will not recognize the risk of being migrated from the regulated entity to the unregulated entity; that allowing QCC to operate in QC territory would allow Qwest to circumvent rate regulation of local exchange service simply by providing that service through QCC; and that such "self-deregulation" would be

accomplished without the Board making a finding of effective competition, as required by the established statutory deregulation scheme. In re: Qwest Communications Corporation, Docket TCU-03-13, Order dated November 29, 2004 ("lowa QCC Order"), at 4-5.

⁷ Iowa QCC Order, at 5.

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of QCC's agreement to continue QC's current practice (which is also in place in Arizona) of disclosing to customers who call Qwest to inquire about obtaining services of the availability, from QC, of rate-regulated, flat-rate single line residential service (1FR).8

In Nebraska, the Public Service Commission granted QCC authority to operate statewide, subject to certain limitations and controls for QCC service in QC incumbent territory that were already in place from a 1998 Nebraska Commission order; however, the Commission observed in its order granting QCC authority that the changing market for telecommunications requires reevaluation of older views of affiliate competition in incumbent territory:

In light of the testimony of Qwest regarding the state of competition in Nebraska, however, the Commission encourages Qwest to immediately file a request to terminate the limitation of service offerings within the affiliate ILEC's service territory consistent with the direction in Docket No. C-1839/PI-22. The Commission will process Qwest's request on an expedited basis.

QCC has filed the request "encouraged" by the Nebraska Commission, and the proceeding is pending.¹⁰ QCC believes that the restrictions imposed by the Nebraska Commission's 1998 order are improper and is optimistic that they will be lifted in the pending docket; regardless. Nebraska still allows QCC to compete for a substantial portion of business and government customers in QC territory.

Staff's Report also mentions a few non-QC states that purportedly limit BOC affiliates from competing in incumbent territory, but closer examination of the laws in these states shows that none of them have taken the extreme approach recommended by Staff here. Some of the states do not even take the approach Staff claims they do. For instance, Kansas is cited as a jurisdiction which only approves CLEC affiliate applications for advanced services. But in the application cited in the Staff Report, the applicant, an affiliate of SBC, only requested to provide

⁸ Owest Communications Corporation, Local Exchange Public Convenience and Necessity, Case No. PU-04-160,

Order dated July 21, 2004 ("North Dakota QCC Order"), at 3-4.

In the Matter of the Application of Qwest Communications Corporation Seeking Authority to Operate as a Competitive Local Exchange Carrier of Telecommunications Services Within the State of Nebraska, Application No. C-3201, Order Dated December 14, 2004 ("Nebraska QCC Order"), at 5.

¹⁰ The matter is Docket No. C-3335, and is titled In the Matter of the Application of Qwest Communications Corporation to Remove Restrictions of Commission Order in Docket C-1839.

advanced services.¹¹ The provision of basic, voice services was not proposed and was not at issue. Similarly, in the Alabama case cited in footnote 8 of the Staff Report, while Staff claims that "at least one state has certificated the BOC CLEC affiliate to operate outside of its BOC ILEC service territory," the applicant in that case was BellSouth, Inc., the BOC itself, which was seeking CLEC authority outside its incumbent territory.¹² Neither the issue of CLEC affiliate authority nor the issue of affiliates serving in incumbent territory were present in that case.

Staff also claims that in Texas, TEX. UTIL. CODE § 54.102 permits an affiliated CLEC to provide advanced services, but not flat-rated local exchange services to residential and business customers in the BOC's serving area. However, TEX. UTIL. CODE § 54.102(e) expressly *permits* affiliated CLECs to provide such services, except to the extent that the provision of services would result in an individual customer-based contract that the affiliated ILEC could not otherwise offer:¹³

An affiliate of a company that holds a certificate of convenience and necessity and that serves more than five million access lines in this state may hold a certificate of operating authority or service provider certificate of operating authority to provide service in an area of this state in which its affiliated company is the incumbent local exchange company. However, the affiliate holding the certificate of operating authority or service provider certificate of operating authority may not provide in that area any service listed in Sections 58.051(a)(1)-(4) or Sections 58.151(1)-(4), or any subset of those services, in a manner that results in a customer-specific contract so long as the affiliated company that is the incumbent local exchange company may not provide those services or subsets of services in a manner that results in a customer-specific contract under Section 58.003 in that area.... 14

¹¹ In the Matter of the Application of SBC Advanced Solutions, Inc. for a Certificate of Convenience and Authority to Transact the Business of a Telecommunications Carrier for the Purpose of Providing Advanced Data Services and Other Telecommunications Services Within the State of Kansas and for Approval of its Initial Tariff, Docket No.

OO-SBAT-247-COC, Kansas Corporation Commission, 2000 Kan. PUC LEXIS 1068 (January 13, 2000), ¶¶ 1, 14. ¹² BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., Applicant, DOCKET 27663, Alabama Public Service Commission 2000 Ala. PUC LEXIS 72 (Order dated September 13, 2000).

 ¹³ It would appear from the statutory language that if the affiliated ILEC could offer an individual customer-based contract, the affiliated CLEC could also offer such services in the incumbent's territory.
 14 Tex. Util. Code § 54-102(e) (emphasis added). Tex. Util. Code § 58.003 permits large ILECs to offer

TEX. UTIL. CODE § 54-102(e) (emphasis added). TEX. UTIL. CODE § 58.003 permits large ILECs to offer customer-specific contracts if the ILEC installed SS7 signaling and fiber links between its central offices and tandem switches.

One state Staff did not mention in its survey of states addressing competition by affiliated CLECs is Kentucky. In 1997, Kentucky's Public Service Commission limited a BellSouth affiliated CLEC, BellSouth BSE, to areas outside BellSouth's incumbent territory. In 1999, Kentucky's Commission removed that restriction, and permitted BellSouth BSE "to provide local exchange service on a statewide basis." That 1999 order did not restrict BellSouth BSE from pursuing any specific customers or class of customers in BellSouth's incumbent territory, but did impose some reporting, separations, and accounting requirements on BellSouth BSE. Subsequently, on October 29, 2004, most of even those restrictions were deemed unnecessary and removed, because the Kentucky Commission found the concerns it previously held about anticompetitive behavior and use of an affiliate to avoid Commission regulation "have not materialized." Kentucky's approach reflects regulation aimed at the current competitive landscape – not the vastly different competitive environment that existed in 1997 and 1998.

Finally, Staff's Report ignores the fact that in 2003, this Commission, after years of testing, investigation, and testimony, concluded that Arizona's telecommunications markets were open to competition when it recommended that the FCC approve Qwest's application to re-enter the long distance market in Arizona. These realities of the present market and legal landscape require and warrant a far different approach than contained in Staff's Report, and Staff's recommendation number 19 in particular.

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¹⁵ Order, An investigation into the Propriety of, and Potential Safeguards for, the Provision of Local Exchange
24 Service by GTE Communications Corporation, Case No. 98-410, Kentucky Public Service Commission, August 31, 1999.

^{25 16 1999} Kentucky PSC Order, p 4-5.

¹⁷ Order, An investigation into the Propriety of, and Potential Safeguards for, the Provision of Local Exchange Service by GTE Communications Corporation, Case No. 98-410, Kentucky Public Service Commission, October 29, 2004.

C. QCC Lacks the Legal Ability to Improperly Leverage QC's ILEC Position and Engage in Anti-Competitive Conduct such as Cross-Subsidization, Discrimination, or Price-Squeezing.

The first and third listed concerns on page 8 of Staff's Report boil down to the same argument: QC will treat QCC more favorably than other CLECs, which would harm competition. These concerns are based on two false premises: (1) that under existing federal and Arizona law, QC can discriminate in favor of QCC compared to other CLECs, and (2) that the FCC and this Commission are unable and/or unwilling to enforce these laws.

1. Federal and state laws prohibit discrimination.

As to the first point, a bevy of federal and state laws currently require transparency of all of QC's transactions with QCC, and prevent both QC and QCC from improperly "leveraging" their relationship. Sections 251 and 252 of the Act bar QC from discriminating against other CLECs in its interconnection dealings with QCC imposing on QC:

To this end, in all fourteen QC in-region states, QCC has entered into agreements with QC consistent with and modeled upon QC's statement of generally available terms ("SGAT"), and those agreements have been filed for approval and have become effective.

Arizona's state discrimination laws are similarly broad. Arizona's Constitution requires QC's charges for its services to be just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory:

All charges made for service rendered, or to be rendered, by public service corporations within this State shall be just and reasonable, and no discrimination in charges, service, or facilities shall be made between persons or places for rendering a like and contemporaneous service ¹⁹

¹⁸ 47 USC § 251(c)(3).

¹⁹ ARIZONA CONSTITUTION, Art. 15, § 12.

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Discrimination between persons, localities or classes of service as to rates, charges, service or facilities prohibited.

A public service corporation shall not, as to rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any prejudice or disadvantage.

No public service corporation shall establish or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service, facilities or in any other respect, either between localities or between classes of service.

The commission may determine any question of fact arising under this section.²⁰

In addition, the existing requirements of AAC R14-2-804 regarding Commission review of transactions between public utilities and affiliates further require transparency and fairness in affiliate transactions.²¹ These requirements prevent discrimination, cross-subsidization, or other anti-competitive conduct, as the FCC observed in paragraph 315 of the Section 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order quoted above. 22

Sections 271 and 272 of the Act, and the regulations adopted under those statutes, even more sharply limit and control any opportunity for QCC to receive more favorable treatment from QC compared to any other CLEC, on a broader spectrum of transactions. Section 272(b) requires the long distance affiliates of QC, like QCC, to be structurally separated from the ILEC, specifically requiring that QC and QCC:

- (1) shall operate independently from the Bell operating company;
- (2) shall maintain books, records, and accounts in the manner prescribed by the Commission which shall be separate from the books, records, and accounts maintained by the Bell operating company of which it is an affiliate;

²⁰ ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 40-334.

²¹ Because of the limited extent of the waiver from R14-2-803 granted in Decision No. 64654, QCC agrees with Staff's recommendation in section 2.8 of its Report that the waiver need not be revisited at this time.

²² Supra, p.4 ("To the extent that there are concerns that the BOCs will unlawfully subsidize their affiliates or accord them preferential treatment, we reiterate that improper cost allocations and discrimination are prohibited by existing Commission rules and sections 251, 252 and 272 of the 1996 Act, and that predatory pricing is prohibited by the antitrust laws. . .").

(3) shall have separate officers, directors, and employees from the Bell operating company of which it is an affiliate;

- (4) may not obtain credit under any arrangement that would permit a creditor, upon default, to have recourse to the assets of the Bell operating company; and
- (5) shall conduct all transactions with the Bell operating company of which it is an affiliate on an arm's length basis with any such transactions reduced to writing and available for public inspection.²³

Moreover, QC cannot discriminate in favor of QCC and against other CLECs – and not only in the more limited context of interconnection pursuant to sections 251 and 252. Section 272(c) requires that QC:

- (1) may not discriminate between that company or affiliate and any other entity in the provision or procurement of goods, services, facilities, and information, or in the establishment of standards; and
- (2) shall account for all transactions with an affiliate described in subsection (a) in accordance with accounting principles designated or approved by the Commission.²⁴

In addition, section 272(e) provides that QC:

- (1) shall fulfill any requests from an unaffiliated entity for telephone exchange service and exchange access within a period no longer than the period in which it provides such telephone exchange service and exchange access to itself or to its affiliates;
- (2) shall not provide any facilities, services, or information concerning its provision of exchange access to the affiliate described in subsection (a) unless

²³ 47 USC § 272(b). *See also* 47 CFR § 53.203. ²⁴ 47 USC § 272(c).

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such facilities, services, or information are made available to other providers of interLATA services in that market on the same terms and conditions;

- (3) shall charge the affiliate described in subsection (a), or impute to itself (if using the access for its provision of its own services), an amount for access to its telephone exchange service and exchange access that is no less than the amount charged to any unaffiliated interexchange carriers for such service; and
- (4) may provide any interLATA or intraLATA facilities or services to its interLATA affiliate if such services or facilities are made available to all carriers at the same rates and on the same terms and conditions, and so long as the costs are appropriately allocated.²⁵

Staff ignores these laws. Staff Data Request Response No. 1-4(c) indicates that the "anti-competitive conduct" alleged in the first identified concern in the Staff Report means QC charging QCC below market rates for certain services, "because QCC's competitors would not have access to the same deals available to QCC from QC." Staff Data Request Response No. 1-4(f) defines "cross-subsidization" as used in the first listed concern in the Staff Report as "the ability of QCC to receive services from QC at below market rates." Staff Data Request Response No. 1-6(a) defines "discrimination" as identified in Staff's third listed concern to "mean[] that QC could provide more favorable terms of service to QCC that it does not provide to other CLECs." But each of these three concerns is clearly and repeatedly condemned in the Act, its underlying regulations, the 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, and Arizona's constitution and statutes.

In its Report, Staff claims that the prohibitions of section 272 "do[] not address all of Staff's concerns in this regard." QCC inquired why, and Staff Data Request No. 1-4(b)

²⁵ 47 USC § 272(e)

³⁰ Section 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, ¶ 216.

answered: "Section 272 applies to QCC's provision of interLATA services. The various restrictions do not apply to QCC's provision of competitive local services." That simply misstates the law. The FCC interprets the non-discrimination obligations of section 272(c) very broadly, holding in the *Section 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order* that "in enforcing the nondiscrimination requirement of section 272(c)(1), we intend to construe these terms broadly to prevent BOCs from discriminating unlawfully in favor of their section 272 affiliates." As a result, the FCC refused "to interpret the terms in section 272(c)(1) as including only telecommunications-related or, even more specifically, common carrier-related 'goods, services, facilities, and information," and ultimately concluded "that the protection of section 272(c)(1) extends to any good, service, facility, or information that a BOC provides to its section 272 affiliate." More specifically, the FCC determined that the non-discrimination obligations of section 272(c) include and extend beyond the non-discrimination obligations of section 251(c), such that there should be no dispute as to whether BOCs' nondiscrimination obligations apply even to its affiliates' local exchange operations:

Although we conclude that the 1996 Act authorizes section 272 affiliates to purchase unbundled elements, we emphasize that BOC facilities and services provided to section 272 affiliates must be made available to others on the same terms, conditions, and prices provided to the BOC affiliate pursuant to the nondiscrimination requirements of sections 272 and 251(c)(3). Thus, if a BOC affiliate is a requesting carrier under section 251, the BOC is required to treat unaffiliated requesting carriers in the same manner that the BOC treats its affiliate, unless the unaffiliated entity has requested different treatment. For example, if a BOC were to provide its section 272 affiliate with access to operational support systems (OSS) functions via a different method or system than it provides to requesting carriers under section 251, we would regard such discriminatory treatment as a violation of section 251(c)(3). We believe such nondiscrimination requirements will prevent BOCs from providing special treatment to their affiliates.³⁴

 $^{^{31}}$ Id., ¶ 217.

 $\int_{-1}^{32} Id.$, ¶ 218.

 $^{^{33}}$ Id., $^{\circ}$ 219 ("We also conclude that the terms "services," "facilities," and "information" in section 272 should be interpreted to include, among other things, the meaning of these terms under section 251(c). The term "facilities," therefore, includes but is not limited to the seven unbundled network elements described in the First Interconnection Order.")

³⁴ Id., ¶ 316 (emphasis added). See also ¶ 315, quoted supra p.4.

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discrimination requirements of the Arizona Constitution and ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 40-334. Quite simply, QC cannot provide virtually any service – whether telecommunications or non-telecommunications, local or non-local – to QCC in a discriminatory fashion.

2. Existing regulations require disclosure and monitoring to ensure prohibited discrimination does not occur.

Staff is simply wrong on the law - and this is without even considering the broad non-

The existing federal scheme does not rely simply on prohibiting discrimination by BOCs. Section 272 and the regulations adopted thereunder also require OC to post all transactions between itself and QCC to a website, and to make the agreements underlying those transactions available on request. In fact, the Staff refers to this requirement on page 5 of its report and states that it has reviewed these filings and found that QC and QCC substantially comply with these regulations, and further states that it "is not aware of any complaint filed by another carrier against QCC and/or QC alleging anticompetitive conduct." These requirements of separation, non-discrimination, and disclosure are further enforced and monitored by a biennial audit by an independent auditor, whose report is submitted to the FCC and made available to applicable state Commissions.³⁵ Staff glosses over these existing protections. Despite the fact that its own additional investigation and review of the biennial audit revealed that Qwest is complying with these obligations (without comment from the competitors and regulators from various states with access to the audit report), 36 Staff nevertheless assumes violations of the law will take place, and further assumes that the FCC and this Commission lack the ability or will to enforce these laws. These baseless assumptions insult the integrity of the enforcement system as well as QC and QCC. Such assumptions are bad policy and would result in bad law.

³⁵ 47 USC § 272(d); 47 CFR § 53.209 *et seq*. ³⁶ Staff Report, at 6.

3. Use of the Qwest brand is not improper "leveraging" of QC's ILEC position.

Staff's only articulated concern regarding QCC's "leveraging" QC's ILEC position, indicated in its responses to QCC's data requests. "addresses the potential advantages that a QCC CLEC operation could gain over other CLECs by using QC's ILEC customer recognition, knowledge of customers and established assets." No law or public interest prohibits QCC from benefiting from name recognition associated with the Qwest brand, just as AT&T's CLEC operations may benefit from the AT&T brand, regardless of the formal name of the corporate entities involved. There is no legal justification for this Commission to limit Qwest's ability to brand its services more than it limits AT&T's or MCI's. Moreover, as discussed above, QCC and the other section 272 affiliate of QC, Qwest LD Corp. ("QLDC") already use the Qwest brand name; use of the Qwest name would only continue branding for QCC's CLEC operations that is already in place for its long distance operations.

4. Staff's Concerns About CPNI Misuse Are Unfounded.

Staff claims in its Report that QCC's responses to data requests cause concern that QCC and QC will misuse QC CPNI, thus giving QCC an improper competitive advantage. First, this "concern" is based on a misunderstanding of CPNI law. QCC will not have access to QC's CPNI any differently than another CLEC would have access to the CPNI of its affiliates or the CPNI of its own customers for other categories of service. Second, Staff admits that QCC's proposed use of QC CPNI, as stated in its responses to Staff data requests, would comply with federal CPNI law³⁸ and the currently proposed Arizona state CPNI rule.³⁹ When QCC asked staff to articulate "how and why the Staff's concern about permissible use of CPNI is different for the relationship between QC and QCC as compared to AT&T's use of its customers' CPNI related to local and long distance services and sales, Staff responded that "AT&T is not the

³⁷ Staff's Response to Qwest [Communications] Corporation's First Set of Data Requests ("Staff Data Request Response"), No. 1-4(a).

Staff Data Request Response No. 1-12(c).
 Staff Data Request Response No. 1-12(d).

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dominant provider of either local or long distance service to customers in Arizona."40 In other words. Staff's concern is not with how CPNI would be shared, but who would be sharing that information, thus prohibiting such sharing for some carriers but not others. The Commission should reject Staff's discriminatory "concerns" in this regard.

5. Staff's "price squeeze" concerns are unfounded and belong in another docket.

Staff's Report does not discuss its concern about so-called price squeezes. Even its responses to the Owest Data Requests indicate "price squeeze" issues are being addressed in the AFOR docket, and are "more of a concern with respect to CLECs in general." While QCC disagrees with most of the arguments commonly made about "price squeezes," QCC does agree those arguments really have no place in this docket. No action the Commission could take on QCC's Application could alter QC's wholesale obligations. QCC, as a CLEC reliant on nondiscriminatory access to QC's network elements under the readily available terms of QC's SGAT, simply cannot place any other carrier in a price squeeze position. Even if at some point in the future QCC obtained facilities for its local exchange operations, and if QCC were to sell access to those facilities or services using those facilities at wholesale, and if QCC's prices were higher than TELRIC standards would otherwise yield, any carrier would still have access to network elements from QC at TELRIC rates. Staff's "price squeeze" concerns are baseless. Regardless, resolution of these concerns is more properly left to other dockets.

QCC's Joint Marketing Efforts, Expressly Permitted Under Section 272 of the Act, Will Not Create Any Harmful Confusion in the Marketplace.

Without foundation, Staff claims that consumer confusion could result from QCC and QC both offering services in QC incumbent territory. To the contrary, the fact that QC and QCC will both use the Qwest brand name will reduce any potential for customer confusion. Use of

 ⁴⁰ Staff Data Request Response No. 1-12(e).
 41 Staff Data Request Response No. 1-4(i).

the Qwest name tells Arizona customers from whom their telephone services are purchased and from whom they can obtain service. This will continue as QCC uses the Qwest name to market its CLEC services. On the other hand, if QCC used different names for its CLEC services and its IXC services, customer confusion would likely result, as the Qwest affiliation would not be clear to consumers. The use of a name other than Qwest to market its services could potentially subject QCC to allegations that it was intentionally trying to mislead customers and hide its relationship to QC. It is not clear that a QCC customer who thought he/she was dealing with the RBOC entity because the service had been marketed as "Qwest" would be more confused and/or upset than a customer who purchased service from "Generic Arizona CLEC" believing that he/she was dealing with someone other than Qwest. Moreover, as noted above, similar corporate names or branding strategies have been allowed in Arizona for years. Many independent incumbent carriers use their corporate name in their CLEC operations, and other IXC/CLEC affiliates such as AT&T. MCI, and Sprint are permitted to use their parent corporations' brands in their marketing. Use of the Qwest brand is consumer-friendly and is in the public interest.

Staff's concern about consumer confusion must also be rejected on legal grounds. In section 272(g) of the Act, Congress made clear that BOCs like QC and Section 272 affiliates like QCC could jointly market their services. Staff's concern about customer confusion would, as a practical matter, limit QCC's rights to joint marketing in contravention of the federal Act. The Commission should reject Staff's proposal to preempt section 272.

E. Approving QCC's Application Will Not Enable QC to Evade its Regulatory Obligations.

Staff argues that if QCC has authority to provide CLEC services in QC incumbent territory, QC will be able to evade its regulatory obligations. Staff fails to articulate, however, either what obligations QC could possibly evade with QCC's presence in its incumbent territory, or how QCC's presence in QC incumbent territory could enable QC to evade any of those obligations. Staff doesn't articulate these risks, because they do not exist. As noted above,

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Serve the Public Interest.

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every marketing decision wireline carriers make.

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more wireless "access lines" than wireline. Thus, the presence of wireless services in the market constrains almost

QCC's Presence in Arizona's Competitive Market for Telecommunications Will

sufficiently competitive to permit QCC to operate in QC incumbent territory. This concern

misses the mark in two different ways. First, Arizona is a strongly competitive market. Cox

Telephone has made huge gains in the Phoenix and Tucson markets. Wireless services offer a

substitute for wireline for an increasing number of consumers every year. 43 And voice over

internet protocol - a service for which providers need no state certificate of authority - is

radically changing the competitive environment. Moreover, the ready availability of unbundled

network elements at TELRIC prices means that an entrepreneur can compete with Owest with

only a limited capital investment. These existing market forces, combined with the relative ease

with which a competitor could enter the market even if anticompetitive behavior drove other

carriers away, effectively prevents Qwest from engaging in - or at least profiting from - any

anticompetitive behavior, even if the Commission assumes it cannot enforce existing laws.

Consumers have so many alternatives to Qwest service, and barriers to entry are so low, that any

increased costs or decreased profits Qwest might suffer in order to pursue any given

anticompetitive business strategy cannot be regained even if Qwest could drive its wireline

Staff's fifth articulated concern is that Arizona's telecommunications market is not

competitors from the market. 42 Staff Report, at 10. ⁴³ Though not a perfect substitute for every customer, wireless services offer a full or partial substitute for many wireline customers and services. Indeed, QCC anticipates that the evidence at hearing will reveal that there are now

Second, Staff's concerns appear to be articulated from the perspective of protecting competitors, rather than the perspective of competition or consumers themselves. If QCC is granted the authority it seeks, customers in QC incumbent territory that desire single provider, single bill, and combined local services with intra- and interLATA services will have an additional choice they presently lack. Additional choices for consumers mean more competition, lower prices and greater innovation.⁴⁴ This serves the public interest.

III. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS

In Section 5.1 of the Staff Report, at page 16, Staff states, "At this time, the Applicant has not yet published legal notice of the Application in all counties in which it requests authorization to provide service." QCC has complied with the notice requirements of the procedural order in this docket. The legal notice was published on February 11, 2005 and the affidavit was filed with Docket Control on February 24, 2005.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Qwest's Application for Certificate of Convenience and Necessity is reasonable and in the public interest and should be approved. Staff's recommended condition number 19 is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. To the extent that the concerns Staff expresses are not illusory, existing laws provide ample protection against potential abuse. Further, Staff's recommended condition number 19 would prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of Qwest Communications Corporation to provide intrastate telephone service, and would therefore violate 47 U.S.C. Section 253 of the Act. Qwest Communications

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⁴⁴ Section 272 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, ¶ 315 ("We agree with the BOCs that the increased flexibility resulting from the ability to provide both interLATA and local services from the same entity serves the public interest, because such flexibility will encourage section 272 affiliates to provide innovative new services.")

1	Corporation's certificate of convenience and necessity should not be limited to areas outside of		
2	Qwest Corporation's service territory, or otherwise.		
3	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of March, 2005.		
4			
5	QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION		
6			
7	By: Norman G. Curtright 4041 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1100 Phoenix, AZ 85012		
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9			
10	Its Attorney		
11	Were filed this 16th day of March, 2005 with:		
12			
13	Docket Control		
14	Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street		
15	Phoenix AZ 85007		
16	Copy mailed and e-mailed		
17	this 16th day of March, 2005 to:		
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